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1. Introduction
A common assumption in the dynamic mechanism design literature is that the agent’s privately
observed shocks are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). As pointed out by Fernandes and
Phelan (2000), this assumption is merely for the sake of tractability. It implies that, at the beginning
of a given date, an agent’s forward-looking utility of following a given strategy when facing a given
contract is independent of past histories.1
However, in many economic environments with hidden information, the agent’s shocks are highly
persistent. For example, in the design of optimal health insurance, a customer’s health condition today is
strongly correlated with her previous condition. And in unemployment insurance where an unemployed
worker’s searching effort is hidden, it is reasonable to conjecture that the worker’s chance of finding a
new job depends not only on her current effort but also on her searching effort in the past.
In this paper, we develop continuous-time methods for solving dynamic contracting problems and
apply them to an optimal taxation model in which the agent’s privately observed productivity shocks
are persistent over time. Productivity process is modeled as a finite-state Markov chain with transitions
arriving as a Poisson process. A key technique that we develop is that, in continuous time, the incentive
constraints are transformed into a system of differential equations and inequalities. This system of
equations connects the principal’s choice variables and the evolution of the promised utilities, thus
allows us to rewrite the contracting problem as a stochastic control problem. We then study the
stochastic control problem and obtain a sharp characterization of the optimal contract.
We find that the cost of delivering a utility vector is increasing in the promised utility but decreasing
in the transitional utility. We also find that for each level of promised utility to the low-productivity
agent, there is an efficient (cost-minimizing) level of transitional utility. However, when the agent
reports low productivity, the principal has to move the transitional utility strictly below the efficient
level, since the high-productivity type has an incentive to misreport and reduce her effort. This feature
makes the persistent shock contract open to renegotiation, because moving back to the efficiency level
makes the agent indifferent and the principal strictly better off. This is different from the i.i.d. shock
case, where the contract is always renegotiation proof.
There are many features that persistent shock models share with i.i.d. shock models. The agent’s
promised utility moves up with a high report and moves down with a low report. The consumption and
output levels for a high report are both higher than those for a low report when compared at similar
levels of promised utilities. The immiserization result continues to hold in persistent shock models,
because the martingale property (associated with the inverse Euler equation) remains valid.2
1This notion of common knowledge about preferences was first discussed in Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and Milgrom
(1990).
2Farhi and Werning (2007) show that immiserization is avoided when the principal is more patient than the agent.
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Based on these findings, we conclude that, qualitatively, the persistent shock models are similar to
i.i.d. shocks. However, quantitatively, persistence is still an important issue that should not be ignored.
Through a numerical example, we find that the distortions in the persistent shock model are much larger
than in the i.i.d. shock model. Thus, using i.i.d. shocks as an approximation to the true productivity
shocks would seriously underestimate the role of the tax system in a Mirrleesian model.
1.1 Related Literature
Our formulation of the problem is based largely on ideas in Fernandes and Phelan (2000). They
developed a recursive formulation for contracting problems in which private types are serially corre-
lated. In these situations, different types of agents derive different continuation utilities from the same
continuation contract due to type-specific priors. When the agent chooses between truth-telling and
lying, she compares the continuation utility as a truth-teller and the continuation utility as a liar. Thus,
the principal finds it necessary to enforce a vector of utilities for all the potentially different types. They
showed that this vector of continuation utilities is the state variable in their recursive formulation. Our
work provides an analytical characterization of the optimal contract, which is different from Fernandes
and Phelan (2000), who solved the optimal contract by numerical iteration following Abreu, Pearce,
and Staccheti (1990).
This paper is motivated by the literature on continuous-time contracting with hidden actions (Holm-
strom and Milgrom (1987), Schattler and Sung (1993), Cvitanic, Wan, and Zhang (2007), Williams
(2006), Westerfield (2006), Sannikov (2007a,b)). The literature shows that setting principal-agent mod-
els in continuous time could allow for more explicit characterization of the solution. The novelty in
this paper involves our modeling of the random process. Since the traditional continuous-time methods
with diffusion process cannot be readily adopted to study hidden information models with persistent
shocks (see Section 7 for an explanation), we model the agent’s type as a finite-state Markov chain,
which introduces techniques that are different from, but complementary to, the above literature.
There are a few recent papers studying dynamic contracts with private and persistent shocks.
Kapicka (2007) studied an optimal taxation model with a continuum of productivity shocks in a discrete-
time model. By assuming the validity of the first-order approach, he reduced the infinite-dimensional
state variable to a vector of two numbers: promised utility and its derivative. This simplification allows
him to numerically compute a taste-shock model, which sheds light on the properties of the tax system
in dynamic taxation models. Williams (2008) also studied persistent shocks with a continuum of shocks,
but in continuous time. He considered a related first-order approach, but by using the continuous-time
techniques he had developed in Williams (2006), he provided sufficient conditions to check whether the
solution from the first-order approach is fully incentive compatible. Furthermore, he found that the
3
inverse Euler equation does not hold in his environment and the immiserization property disappears.3
Finally, our paper is closely related to the literature on dynamic social insurance and taxation
(Albanesi (2006), Albanesi and Sleet (2006), Atkeson and Lucas (1992), Golosov, Kocherlakota, and
Tsyvinski (2003), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006, 2007), Kocherlakota (2005), Kapicka (2006)). Our
model is a simplified version (with neither aggregate resource constraint nor capital accumulation) of
Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003) and Kocherlakota (2005). However, our research focuses
more on developing a methodology and understanding the analytical properties of the optimal contract.
Battaglini and Coate (2003) studied a persistent shock dynamic taxation model with risk-neutral agents.
The distortion in their model eventually vanishes in two senses. First, it vanishes permanently with
any high-productivity report. Second, the distortion decreases to zero for an agent who always reports
low productivity. We can apply the continuous-time methods to study their model and confirm their
findings. However, when we study risk-averse utilities, we find that the distortion increases with the
low-productivity report and never vanishes. These differences suggest that risk aversion is critical for
the patterns of the distortion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the economic environment and
sets up the social planner’s contracting problem. In Section 3, we derive the continuous-time evolution
of the state variable as differential equations and inequalities. The resulting differential equations are
put to use in Section 4 to characterize the set of implementable utility pairs and in Section 5 to study
the long-run dynamics of the optimal contract. In Section 6, through a numerical example, we show
that the models with persistent shocks imply significantly larger wedges than the models with i.i.d.
shocks. The last section concludes. All proofs are collected in the Appendices.
2. A Dynamic Contracting Problem
2.1 The Environment and the Shock Process
Time is continuous. Consider a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent who engage in long-
term contracting at time 0. Both the principal and the agent are able to commit. The preferences of
the agent are
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt [u(ct)− v(yt)/θt] dt
]
,(1)
where ct and yt are the agent’s consumption and output at time t, r is her discount rate, θt is her
private taste shock, and E is an expectations operator. The principal has the same discount rate r and
3The first-order approach is able to reduce the dimension of the state variable to a small number, but its validity is
still unestablished. Williams (2008) provided sufficient conditions for the first-order approach, but these conditions may
either be overly stringent or fail to hold.
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minimizes
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt [ct − yt] dt
]
,(2)
which is the expected discounted cost of the consumption-output plan. We assume that u : [0, c¯]→ [0, u¯]
is twice continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave (u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0). The disutility
function v : [0, y¯]→ [0, v¯] is twice continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly convex (v′ > 0 and
v′′ > 0). The agent’s privately observed taste shock θt can be re-interpreted as a productivity shock if
v(y) = yγ , γ > 1. Define φ = θ1/γ as the agent’s productivity. She is able to transform one unit of labor
into φ units of output. Her disutility depends on the amount of labor l = y/φ she spends to produce y,
thus the disutility is v(l) = v(y)/θ.
The shock process (θt)t≥0 is a time-homogeneous, continuous-time Markov chain with a finite state
space Θ = {θ1, θ2, ..., θN}, where 0 < θ1 < θ2 < ... < θN , and a generator matrix Q = (qij)1≤i,j≤N .
Let N = {1, 2, ..., N} be the set of indices. A probability space (Ω,F , P ) is described as follows. Let
sample space Ω be{
ω : [0,∞)→ N
∣∣∣ ω is right continuous, has a finite number of jumps in any interval [0, t], t ≥ 0} .
Each ω ∈ Ω describes a complete sample path of random indices. For t ≥ 0, the random variable
ιt(ω) = ω(t) describes the state at t. To keep track of information, endow Ω with a filtration, i.e., a
nondecreasing family {Ft}t≥0 of σ-fields, where Ft = σ((ιs)0≤s≤t) and F = σ (∪t≥0Ft). Ft denotes
the information from 0 up to t, including the number of jumps up to t, the timing, and the destinations
of these jumps. The generator matrix Q satisfies the following conditions:
(i) −qii > 0 for all i; (For convenience, we use qi to denote −qii)
(ii) qij > 0 for all i 6= j;
(iii)
∑
j qij = 0 for all i.
Each entry qij (i 6= j) is the rate of moving from state i to state j, and qi =
∑
j 6=i qij > 0 is the rate of
leaving state i. For all t, h ≥ 0, conditional on ιt = i,
Pr(ιt+h = j|ιt = i) = δij + qijh+ o(h),
where δij is 1 if i = j, and 0 otherwise. An equivalent way to describe the continuous-time Markov
chain is that, conditional on ιt = i, the holding time S (which records the duration that the chain stays
in i before a transition) is an exponential random variable of parameter qi, and once a transition occurs,
it jumps to state j (j 6= i) with probability qij/qi. We can always endow the measurable space (Ω,F )
with a probability measure P such that under P , (ιt)t≥0 is a Markov chain with the generator matrix
Q and the properties mentioned above (see, for example, Norris (1997, Chapter 2)).
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2.2 The Contracting Problem
The agent knows her initial type and privately observes (ιt)t≥0 afterwards, while the principal cannot
observe the realizations and holds a belief that the agent’s initial type is i with probability pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
At time 0, the principal offers a contract, which the agent may either accept or reject. If the agent
rejects, then she gets the outside option U¯i if her initial type is i. Otherwise, she sequentially reports the
newly observed shocks to the principal, and the principal implements the contract based on reported
histories.
In each period t, based on realized shocks (ιs)0≤s≤t, the agent makes a report σt to the principal.
Collectively, with sample path ω realized, the agent’s reported history is σ = (σt)t≥0. Therefore, we
define the agent’s reporting strategy to be a measurable function σ : (Ω,F ) → (Ω,F ). Moreover,
at time t, since an agent is unable to distinguish between two sample paths ω1, ω2, where ω1(s) =
ω2(s), ∀s ∈ [0, t], the reported paths have to satisfy σ(ω1)(s) = σ(ω2)(s),∀s ∈ [0, t]. This means that
σ should also be measurable from (Ω,Ft) to (Ω,Ft) for any t ≥ 0. We could write σt(ω) = σt(ω[0,t]),
where ω[0,t] is the restriction of ω on [0, t]. Notice that this definition of a reporting strategy implicitly
imposes restrictions on the agent’s reports; when the reports at different t are pieced together, the
reported history σ(ω) has to be right continuous and admits finite jumps in finite time. This restriction
is innocuous. Since the true sample paths have these properties, if the agent cheats and, for example,
her reports fail to be right continuous, then cheating will be identified by the principal. Intuitively, right
continuity prohibits the agent from immediately reverting to truth-telling after misreporting at t, and
the finite-jump condition prohibits her from switching between truth-telling and cheating too often. A
reporting strategy σ is truth-telling if σ(ω) = ω, for all ω ∈ Ω. We use σ∗ to denote the truth-telling
strategy.
The principal offers a contract C = (ct, yt)t≥0 at time 0, where the measurable functions ct :
(Ω,Ft)→ [0, c¯] and yt : (Ω,Ft)→ [0, y¯] specify the agent’s consumption and output at t, respectively.
We use Ω to denote both the set of true realizations and the set of reports. As a collection of subsets that
contain reports, the algebra Ft describes the principal’s information structure; while as a collection of
subsets that contain the true shocks, it describes the agent’s information structure. When the reporting
strategy is σ, the principal’s information in the space of true shocks, σ−1(Ft) = {A ⊆ Ω : σ(A) ∈ Ft},
is weakly coarser than that of the agent. Here for the principal, Ω is the set of reports and the
measurability condition requires that ct and yt be based only upon the reports available from 0 up to
(and including) t. We assume that a contract is progressively measurable; in other words, the mapping
(s, ω) → (cs(ω), ys(ω)) : ([0, t] × Ω,B([0, t]) ⊗Ft) → (R2,B(R2)) is measurable for all t ≥ 0.4 Note
that the information structure here is similar to that in the discrete-time literature. Within a period
4This technical condition requires the joint measurability of the contract as a function of (s, ω) in the product space,
which, together with the measurability of σ, guarantees that the following promised utilities are well-defined.
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(or instant), the timing is that an agent first makes her report then receives her compensation. In both
cases, consumption and output under the contract are allowed to jump instantaneously with the arrival
of a new report, rather than being required to be predictable functions of past reports.
It is useful to study the agent’s promised utility vector based on different histories, which turns
out to be the state variable in a recursive formulation. Denote the set of possible histories before the
realization of ιt by
N t− =
{
ιt− : [0, t)→ N
∣∣∣ ιt− is right continuous, has a finite number of jumps} .
An agent’s future discounted utility when she has a history of reports ht− ∈ N t−, her realization of ιt
is i and she follows a strategy σ is
wi(ht−;σ,C )
= Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)
[
u(cs(ht−, (σ(ω))[t,∞)))− v(ys(ht−, (σ(ω))[t,∞)))/θω(s)
]
ds
∣∣∣ω(t) = i] ,
where (σ(ω))[t,∞) is the restriction of the report σ(ω) on [t,∞), and (ht−, (σ(ω))[t,∞)) denotes a sample
path (or report) where ht− is followed by (σ(ω))[t,∞). In particular, if σ = σ∗,
wi(ht−;σ∗,C )(3)
= Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)
[
u(cs(ht−, ω[t,∞)))− v(ys(ht−, ω[t,∞)))/θω(s)
]
ds
∣∣∣ω(t) = i]
= Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)
[
u(cs(ht−, ω[t,s]))− v(ys(ht−, ω[t,s]))/θω(s)
]
ds
∣∣∣ω(t) = i] .
It will be crucial to distinguish between persistent promised utility and transitional promised utilities.
The report at an instant t may either be the same as previous reports or indicate a transition. Accord-
ingly, there are two types of promised utilities: the utility associated with no transition and the utilities
associated with all possible transitions. More precisely, let i∗t = lims↑t ht−(s) be the report of type
immediately before t. Then wi∗t (h
t−;σ∗,C ) is called the persistent promised utility and wi(ht−;σ∗,C ),
(i 6= i∗t ), are called the transitional promised utilities. When the agent’s current report is the same as
the previous reports, she receives the persistent promised utility; otherwise, if there is a transition to
state i, she receives wi(ht−;σ∗,C ). Detailed discussion of the promised utilities is provided in the next
section.
A contract C is said to be incentive compatible (I.C.) if for any t, any ht− ∈ N t−, and any strategy
σ,
wi(ht−;σ∗,C ) ≥ wi(ht−;σ,C ), for all i.(4)
In this environment with commitment, it follows from the revelation principle that we could restrict
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attention to I.C. contracts. The principal’s problem can then be written as
minC
N∑
i=1
piE
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt [ct(ω)− yt(ω)] dt
∣∣∣ω(0) = i](5)
subject to C is I.C.,
wi(∅;σ∗,C ) ≥ U¯i, for all i,
where ∅ denotes an empty history and U¯i is the type i agent’s outside option.
3. Incentive Constraints and the Evolution of (wi(h
t−))1≤i≤N
In this section, we show that (wi(ht−;σ∗,C ))1≤i≤N is the state variable for a dynamic programming
problem, and that the incentive constraints can be simplified as differential equations (and inequalities)
that describe the evolution of the state variable.
In the following discussion, the discounted utility wi(ht−;σ∗,C ) will be simplified to wi(ht−) when
σ∗ and C are well understood. i[t,s) denotes a sample path (or report) of type i from t to s (not
including s).
Fix an I.C. contract C . First, consider the continuity property of wi(ht−) as a function of t. Recall
that i∗t denotes the report immediately before t. When limits are taken from the left, wi∗t is the persistent
promised utility and other wi (i 6= i∗t ) are transitional promised utilities. Things become complicated
when limits are taken from the right, since there are N possible paths of reports. Starting from t,
the agent might report i = i∗t , which the principal interprets as no transition, or she might report
i 6= i∗t , which the principal interprets as a transition to i. Following history (ht−, (i∗t )[t,s)), wi∗t is still
the persistent promised utility. However, following (ht−, i[t,s)) (i 6= i∗t ), wi would replace wi∗t to be the
persistent promised utility.
The following lemma shows that the persistent promised utility is continuous, while the transitional
promised utilities have both left and right limits but allow for downward jumps.
Lemma 1 If C is I.C., then
(i) For right-hand limits,
wi(ht−) = lim
s↓t
wi(ht−, i[t,s)), for all i,(6)
wj(ht−) ≥ lim
s↓t
wj(ht−, i[t,s)), for all j 6= i.(7)
(ii) For left-hand limits, let hs− denote the restriction of ht− on [0, s) (s < t),
wi∗t (h
t−) = lim
s↑t
wi∗t (h
s−),(8)
wj(ht−) ≤ lim
s↑t
wj(hs−), for all j 6= i∗t .(9)
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It is useful to understand the meaning of equation (7) with various values of i and j. If j 6= i∗t (she
has a transition to j), then she could not gain by delaying the transition report and reporting i∗t for a
short time (followed by truth-telling), or by reporting a transition to a different state i (i 6= j, i 6= i∗t )
for a short time (followed by truth-telling). If j = i∗t (she does not have a transition), then she could
not gain by reporting a transition to i (i 6= i∗t ) for a short time (followed by truth-telling).5 Similarly,
equation (9) simply means that an agent with a transition to j before t would not delay the transition
report until t.
Next we will obtain a sharper characterization of the evolution of utility wi along any reported
history. Fix a report ht−. It follows from the definition of N t− that there exists a finite collection of
jump times t0 = 0 < t1 < t2 < ... < tn < tn+1 = t and a finite history of past types (i0, i1, ..., in), such
that ht−(s) = ik, if s ∈ [tk, tk+1), 0 ≤ k ≤ n. In the interval [tk, tk+1), wik is the persistent promised
utility and, in addition to being continuous, its evolution is described by a differential equation. wi
(i 6= ik) is a transitional promised utility in [tk, tk+1). Although it could have a countable number of
downward jumps, its evolution is described by a differential inequality (an upper bound on dwi/dt is
found). These differential equations (and inequalities) are both necessary and sufficient conditions for
a contract to be I.C. We turn next to this key characterization result.
Theorem 1 Let C be a contract, and (wi(ht−))1≤i≤N , (wi(ht−) : N t− → R, for all t ≥ 0), be an
arbitrary stochastic process.
(i) (necessity) If C is I.C., and (wi(ht−))1≤i≤N are the promised utilities defined in (3), then for
any history ht− with the form (t0, t1, ..., tn, tn+1; i0, i1, ..., in), wi(hs−) is differentiable for all i
and almost every (a.e.) s ∈ [0, t). If i = ik, then for a.e. s ∈ [tk, tk+1),
dwi(hs−)
ds
= (r + qi)wi(hs−)−
∑
j 6=i
qijwj(hs−)− (u(c(hs))− v(y(hs))/θi).(10)
If i 6= ik, then for a.e. s ∈ [tk, tk+1),
dwi(hs−)
ds
≤ (r + qi)wi(hs−)−
∑
j 6=i
qijwj(hs−)− (u(c(hs))− v(y(hs))/θi).(11)
(ii) (sufficiency) Assume (wi(ht−))1≤i≤N is a bounded process and for any history ht− with the
form (t0, t1, ..., tn, tn+1; i0, i1, ..., in), wi(hs−) is differentiable for all i and a.e. s ∈ [0, t). If
(wi(ht−))1≤i≤N and C satisfy (10) and (11), then (wi(ht−))1≤i≤N satisfies (3), and contract C
is I.C.
5Notice that, strictly speaking, a type j agent at time t may not be the same person as a type j agent at s, (s > t), but
when explaining the intuition, we implicitly assume that the agent has no transition between t and s, since the probability
of having a transition is small when s is close to t.
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It is helpful to understand the meanings of (10) and (11), because all of our remaining results are
derived from this system of differential equations and inequalities. Equation (10) is a promise-keeping
condition. We can rewrite the right side of equation (10) as
[
rwi(hs−)− (u(c(hs))− v(y(hs))/θi)
]
+
∑
j 6=i
qij(wj(hs−)− wj(hs−))
 ,
where the first term is the natural (instantaneous) rate of change of promised utility wi(hs−) when
there is no uncertainty. For j 6= i, each term qij(wi(hs−) − wj(hs−)) captures the additional rate of
change of wi(hs−) due to the transition to state j at arrival rate qij . The promise-keeping condition in
discrete time is
wi(s) = (u(c(s))− v(y(s))/θi)dt+ e−rdt
∑
j 6=i
(qijdt)wj(s+ dt) + e−qidtwi(s+ dt)
 ,(12)
where s and s+ dt denote two periods in discrete time and qijdt is the transitional probability in short
time dt. Equation (10) can be informally derived by taking limit dt→ 0 in (12). (The formal proof can
be found in APPENDIX A.) Inequality (11) is an incentive compatibility condition, the intuition for
which is similar to that of (10). If (11) holds as equality, then type i obtains wi(hs−) by reporting ik,
thus she is indifferent between truth-telling and reporting ik; otherwise, if wi(hs−)/ds is less than the
right side of (11), then reporting ik makes her strictly worse off.
With the conditions on the derivatives of (wi(ht−))1≤i≤N , the principal’s problem is transformed
into a dynamic stochastic control problem. With truth-telling, (wi(ιt−))1≤i≤N and ιt are endogenous
and exogenous state variables, respectively, and (ct, yt) are control variables. Given the current report i
and before the next transition, the system evolves according to a differential inclusion (in the following
discussion, wi(ht−), c(ht), and y(ht) will be simplified to wi(t) (or wi), ct, and yt when ht− and ht are
well understood):
dwi
dt
= (qi + r)wi −
∑
j 6=i
qijwj − u(ct) + v(yt)/θi,
dwj
dt
∈
−∞, (qj + r)wj −∑
k 6=j
qjkwk − u(ct) + v(yt)/θj
 , j 6= i.
Introducing (N − 1) slack control variables µj , µj ≥ 0, j 6= i, the system is
dwi
dt
= (qi + r)wi −
∑
j 6=i
qijwj − u(ct) + v(yt)/θi,
dwj
dt
= (qj + r)wj −
∑
k 6=j
qjkwk − u(ct) + v(yt)/θj − µj , j 6= i.
When a downward jump of wj happens, we interpret it as µj =∞. Given initial states i and (wj)1≤j≤N ,
if (ct(ω[0,t]), yt(ω[0,t]), µi(ω[0,t]))t≥0,1≤i≤N is the optimal policy for the stochastic control problem, then
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the cost Vi((wj)1≤j≤N ) is
Vi((wj)1≤j≤N ) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
ct(ω[0,t])− yt(ω[0,t])
]
dt
∣∣∣ω(0) = i] .
(Vi)1≤i≤N can be directly used to solve the principal’s problem in (5). If the prior belief is degenerate,
(pi = 1, pj = 0, ∀j 6= i, i.e., initial type is known to the principal), then the principal can pick an initial
state (wj)1≤j≤N to start the optimal control problem; except the participation constraint wi ≥ U¯i,
the other states wj(j 6= i) are transitional utilities, and are free to be chosen by the principal. When
the prior belief is not degenerate, the principal can choose a type-dependent state variable to start the
optimal control problem: when the initial report is i, the principal picks an initial state (wij)1≤j≤N . To
prevent a type i agent from misreporting j and immediately reporting a transition to i, and obtaining
the transitional promised utility wji , the incentive constraints w
i
i ≥ wji must be imposed. To summarize
the above discussion, the principal’s problem in (5) is equivalent to
min
(wij)1≤i,j≤N
N∑
i=1
piVi((wij)1≤j≤N )
subject to wii ≥ U¯i,
wii ≥ wji , for all i, j.
Remark 1 The conditions in (10) and (11) are still necessary when the instantaneous utility function
is unbounded. However, for sufficiency, some form of transversality condition is needed. One sufficient
condition is that, for any reporting strategy σ,
lim
t→∞ e
−rtE
[
wιt((σ(ω))
[0,t))
]
= 0.
4. The Set of Implementable Utilities
To simplify the exposition, in the remainder of the paper we will consider only the case in which
N = 2. This section studies the set of implementable utilities, defined as,
W =
{
(w1(∅;σ∗,C ), w2(∅;σ∗,C )) ∈ R2 : C is I.C.
}
,
which is the domain of the value functions. In the next section, we examine the properties of the value
functions and the long-run dynamics implied by them.6
6Both of these sections use the differential equations we developed earlier heavily; however, there is not much depen-
dence between them, and either one could be read first. In the next section, we focus mainly on unbounded utility and
disutility functions, and W with unbounded utilities is much easier to obtain than with bounded utilities (in the next
section, W is the whole set R2), as explained in the following Remark 2. The reader interested in the dynamics of the
optimal contract could skip most of this section, and proceed to Remark 2 and the next section.
11
The common approach in the literature is to compute this set by iteration. Following Abreu, Pearce,
and Staccheti (1990), begin with an initial guess that containsW , then iterate until the sequence of sets
converges to W , which is the largest fixed point of the operator. However, using continuous-time meth-
ods, we will show that this set can be obtained directly. In fact the boundary ofW can be characterized
by differential equations. The remainder of this section will be devoted to this characterization.
We first study some simple contracts. If the contract always specifies maximal consumption c¯ and
minimal output 0, regardless of reports (i.e., ct(ht) = c¯, yt(ht) = 0, ∀ht ∈ N t), then the contract can
implement the pair (u¯/r, u¯/r), which is the upper-right corner of W . If consumption 0 and output y¯
are always specified, then the lower-left corner is implemented. We denote it by −(x1v¯, x2v¯), where
x1 = ((q2 + r)/θ1 + q1/θ2)/(r(q1 + q2 + r)), x2 = (q2/θ1 + (q1 + r)/θ2)/(r(q1 + q2 + r)). Similarly, the
“consumption 0, output 0” contract implements the utility pair (0, 0), while the “consumption c¯, output
y¯” contract implements (−x1v¯ + u¯/r,−x2v¯ + u¯/r).
Next consider four families of contracts. The first two families are indexed by c∗ ∈ (0, c¯). A contract
C 1c
∗
in the first family is (c1c
∗
t (h
t), y1c
∗
t (h
t)) = (c∗, 0), for all ht ∈ N t, which implements the utility
pair
(u(c∗)/r, u(c∗)/r), c∗ ∈ (0, c¯).(13)
A contract C 2c
∗
in the second family is (c2c
∗
t (h
t), y2c
∗
t (h
t)) = (c∗, y¯), for all ht ∈ N t, which implements
the utility pair
(−x1v¯ + u(c∗)/r,−x2v¯ + u(c∗)/r), c∗ ∈ (0, c¯).(14)
The third and fourth families of contracts are indexed by t∗ ∈ (0,∞). A contract C 3t∗ in the third
family is
(c3t
∗
t (h
t), y3t
∗
t (h
t)) =
(0, 0), t ≤ t
∗
(0, y¯), t > t∗,
while in the fourth family, a contract C 4t
∗
is
(c4t
∗
t (h
t), y4t
∗
t (h
t)) =
(c¯, y¯), t ≤ t
∗
(c¯, 0), t > t∗.
The utility pair (w3t
∗
1 , w
3t∗
2 ) implemented by C
3t∗ can be solved in the following way. Under contract
C 3t
∗
, and when t ≤ t∗, the promised utility evolves according to the differential equation system
dw1
dt
= (q1 + r)w1 − q1w2
dw2
dt
= (q2 + r)w2 − q2w1,
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and (w1, w2) will hit (−x1v¯,−x2v¯) at time t∗. Therefore, solving the differential equations together
with the boundary condition yields
w3t
∗
1 = −v¯
[
q1(1/θ1 − 1/θ2)
(q1 + q2)(q1 + q2 + r)
e−(q1+q2+r)t
∗
+
q2/θ1 + q1/θ2
(q1 + q2)r
e−rt
∗
]
,(15)
w3t
∗
2 = −v¯
[
q2(1/θ2 − 1/θ1)
(q1 + q2)(q1 + q2 + r)
e−(q1+q2+r)t
∗
+
q2/θ1 + q1/θ2
(q1 + q2)r
e−rt
∗
]
.(16)
Similarly,
w4t
∗
1 = v¯
[
q1(1/θ1 − 1/θ2)
(q1 + q2)(q1 + q2 + r)
e−(q1+q2+r)t
∗
+
q2/θ1 + q1/θ2
(q1 + q2)r
e−rt
∗
]
− x1v¯ + u¯/r,(17)
w4t
∗
2 = v¯
[
q2(1/θ2 − 1/θ1)
(q1 + q2)(q1 + q2 + r)
e−(q1+q2+r)t
∗
+
q2/θ1 + q1/θ2
(q1 + q2)r
e−rt
∗
]
− x2v¯ + u¯/r.(18)
It turns out that the utility pairs delivered by (C 1c
∗
,C 2c
∗
,C 3t
∗
,C 4t
∗
) form the boundary of W (see
Figure 1).
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w
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W
(−x1v¯,−x2v¯)
line 1
line 2
(0, 0)
curve 3
curve 4
(−x1v¯ + u¯/r,−x2v¯ + u¯/r)
(u¯/r, u¯/r)
Figure 1: The set of implementable utility pairs.
Theorem 2 The boundaries of W consist of the four points (u¯/r, u¯/r), (−x1v¯,−x2v¯), (0, 0), and
(−x1v¯+ u¯/r,−x2v¯+ u¯/r), and the four pieces of curves that connect these points. The lower boundary
is specified in equations (13), (15), and (16), while the upper boundary is specified in equations (14),
(17), and (18).
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It is intuitive that curves in (14), (17), and (18) specify the upper boundary. Since for a fixed w1, in
order to increase w2, the principal could increase consumption and output in a way that makes the
low-productivity agent indifferent but the high-productivity agent better off, it is not surprising to see
that, at curves on the upper boundary, output is maintained at the maximum level y¯. Similarly, output
is at the minimum level 0 on the lower boundary.
Remark 2 When utility is unbounded, it is typically easier to determineW . For example, when utility
and disutility can take any real number, consider the no-information contract, where constant c∗ and
y∗ are specified regardless of reports. This is trivially I.C. and delivers utility w1
w2
 =
 1/r −x1
1/r −x2
 u(c∗)
v(y∗)
 ,
where x1 =
(q2 + r)/θ1 + q1/θ2
r(q1 + q2 + r)
, x2 =
q2/θ1 + (q1 + r)/θ2
r(q1 + q2 + r)
.
Since the matrix has full rank, any (w1, w2) ∈ R2 can be implemented by choosing the appropriate
u(c∗) and v(y∗). Therefore, W = R2 in this case.
5. Dynamics of the Optimal Contract
In previous sections, we simplified the incentive constraints and used them to characterize the set
of implementable utility pairs. In this section, we address the question of the dynamic behavior of the
state variables under the optimal contract. To simplify the analysis, we focus on a special case where
the shock space consists of two elements, Θ = {θ1, θ2}, θ1 < θ2, and the agent has logarithmic utility
and disutility functions, u(c) = log(c), c > 0, and v(y) = − log(−y), y < 0. We assume that the value
functions V1 and V2 in this case are twice differentiable and an optimal contract always exists for any
utility pair (w1, w2). We use Vi,1, Vi,2, Vi,11, Vi,12, Vi,22 to denote ∂Vi∂w1 ,
∂Vi
∂w2
, ∂
2Vi
∂w1∂w1
, ∂
2Vi
∂w1∂w2
, ∂
2Vi
∂w2∂w2
,
respectively, for i = 1, 2.
It is helpful to first preview this lengthy section. We find two parallel efficiency lines, which separate
the state space R2 into three regions. We then show that the bottom region is absorbing. With a
high-productivity report, the state variable moves upward and along the efficiency line, while with
a low-productivity report, the state variable moves downward and enters the interior of the region.
The dynamics of the system are described by an ordinary differential equation (ODE) system, and by
studying the system, we derive many sample path properties, which are summarized in Theorem 3.
Consider first the homogeneity of the value functions. It follows from log(exp(λ)c) = λ+log(c) that
a contract C = (ct, yt)t≥0 implements (w1, w2), if and only if (exp(λ)ct, exp(λ)yt)t≥0 implements
(w1 + (1/r + x1)λ,w2 + (1/r + x2)λ) , for all λ ∈ R,
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where x1 = ((q2+ r)/θ1+ q1/θ2)/(r(q1+ q2+ r)), x2 = (q2/θ1+(q1+ r)/θ2)/(r(q1+ q2+ r)). Therefore,
(c∗t , y∗t )t≥0 is the optimal contract to implement (w1, w2) if and only if (exp(λ)c∗t , exp(λ)y∗t )t≥0 is the
optimal contract at (w1 + (1/r + x1)λ,w2 + (1/r + x2)λ). Moreover, the speed vectors of the time paths
starting from these two initial conditions are identical, i.e., for (w′1, w
′
2) = (w1 + (1/r + x1)λ,w2 + (1/r + x2)λ),
dw1(i[0,t))
dt
=
dw′1(i
[0,t))
dt
,
dw2(i[0,t))
dt
=
dw′2(i
[0,t))
dt
, i = 1, 2.(19)
The next lemma states this homogeneity and uses it to establish other elementary properties of V1
and V2.
Lemma 2 The value functions V1, V2 have the following properties:
(i) (Homogeneity) For any λ ∈ R,
Vi (w1 + (1/r + x1)λ,w2 + (1/r + x2)λ) = exp(λ)Vi(w1, w2), i = 1, 2;(20)
(ii) V1 and V2 are weakly convex;
(iii) (Monotonicity) V1,2 ≤ 0, V1,1 > 0, V2,1 ≤ 0, V2,2 > 0.
Part (iii) of the above lemma states that value functions are monotonic, increasing in the persistent
promised utility but decreasing in the transitional utility. The transitional utility is used as a threat:
it is what a cheater can hope to get if she pretends to be the reported type but immediately reports a
transition to her true type afterwards. For this reason, the transitional utility is also called the threat
utility. The monotonicity in the persistent promised utility is straightforward because the principal
needs to give more consumption to (and require less output from) the agent if he promises more
expected utility to her. The intuition for V1,2 ≤ 0 is as follows. The principal can instantaneously and
freely lower the transitional utility and keep a tighter threat at zero cost; however, once the transitional
utility is moved to a lower level, it is not I.C. to jump back immediately. Thus the cost function
cannot be increasing in the transitional utility. Next we will show that it is strictly decreasing when
the transitional utility is sufficiently low, i.e., for a w1, V1,2 < 0 if w2 is sufficiently low.
Lemma 3 For all w1 ∈ R, {w2 ∈ R : V1,2(w1, w2) < 0} 6= ∅, {w2 ∈ R : V1,2(w1, w2) = 0} 6= ∅. And for
all w2 ∈ R, {w1 ∈ R : V2,1(w1, w2) = 0} 6= ∅, {w1 ∈ R : V2,1(w1, w2) < 0} 6= ∅.
Since V1,2 ≤ 0, V1, as a function of w2, could be strictly decreasing forever or be flat forever. The above
lemma rules out these two possibilities and, together with the convexity of V1, it implies that there is
an intermediate level of w2, below which the value function V1 is strictly decreasing and above which it
is flat. Formally, we can define two curves, f1 and f2 :
f1(w1) = min{w2 ∈ R : V1,2(w1, w2) = 0},
f2(w2) = min{w1 ∈ R : V2,1(w1, w2) = 0}.
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Since V1,2(w1, w2) = 0 if and only if V1,2(w1 + (1/r + x1)λ,w2 + (1/r + x2)λ) = 0, it follows that f1
and f2 are parallel straight lines with slope (1/r + x2)/(1/r + x1). We call f1 and f2 the efficiency
lines, because for each level of promised utility, they indicate the optimal level of transitional utility to
minimize the cost. For example, if initially the principal holds the belief p1 = 1 and he wants to deliver
utility w1 to the agent, then he needs to choose a transitional promised utility as one of the initial state
variables. The optimal level to choose is w2 = f1(w1).
These lines are also critical for the study of the dynamics. Starting from above f1, the state variable
will jump downward to the efficiency line f1 with a report 1, and starting from below f2, the state
variable will jump leftward to f2 with a report 2. We further show that, although the transitional
utility might make downward jumps contingent on the report of a transition, it never jumps when
the report remains unchanged. When it jumps with a report of transition, it always jumps onto the
efficiency lines and stays below them until another transition occurs. The fact that the time path is
smooth when there is no transition is intuitive; since the utility function is strictly concave, making
abrupt changes in transitional utilities without arrival of new information increases the cost for the
principal. The properties of the time path of the state variable are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 For a reported history ht−, if w2(ht−) > f1(w1(ht−)),
lim
s↓t
w2(ht−, 1[t,s)) = f1(w1(ht−)).
Furthermore, w2(ht−, 1[t,s)) is a continuous function of s ∈ (t,∞), so that both w1 and w2 are continuous
following the path of (ht−, 1[t,s)). Similarly, if w1(ht−) > f2(w2(ht−)),
lim
s↓t
w1(ht−, 2[t,s)) = f2(w2(ht−)).
The definition of efficiency lines and the immediate jumps make it clear that
V1(w1, w2) = V1(w1,min(w2, f1(w1))),
V2(w1, w2) = V2(min(w1, f2(w2)), w2).
In the region below the efficiency lines, no further jumps occur in the state variable. Since the evolution
of the state variable is controlled by differential equations in this region, one can lay out the Hamilton–
Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equations that the value functions satisfy.7 For any (w1, w2) with w2 ≤ f1(w1),
V1 satisfies
(q1 + r)V1(w1, w2) = min
c
{c− (V1,1 + V1,2)u(c)}+min
y
{−y + (V1,1/θ1 + V1,2/θ2)v(y)}
+ q1V2(w1, w2) + V1,1((q1 + r)w1 − q1w2)
+ min
µ2≥0
{V1,2((q2 + r)w2 − q2w1 − µ2)}.(21)
7See, for example, Fleming and Soner (2006, equation (7.13), p.134), or see Wa¨lde (2006) for a general reading on
continuous-time methods in economics.
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Similarly, for (w1, w2) with w1 ≤ f2(w2),
(q2 + r)V2(w1, w2) = min
c
{c− (V2,1 + V2,2)u(c)}+min
y
{−y + (V2,1/θ1 + V2,2/θ2)v(y)}
+ q2V1(w1, w2) + min
µ1≥0
{V2,1((q1 + r)w1 − q1w2 − µ1)}
+ V2,2((q2 + r)w2 − q2w1).
In addition, notice that µ2 (µ1) can be non-zero only if V1,2 = 0 (V2,1 = 0). Therefore, if w2 < f1(w1),
we can rewrite the HJB equation as
(q1 + r)V1(w1, w2) = min
c
{c− (V1,1 + V1,2)u(c)}+min
y
{−y + (V1,1/θ1 + V1,2/θ2)v(y)}
+ q1V2(w1, w2) + V1,1((q1 + r)w1 − q1w2)
+ V1,2((q2 + r)w2 − q2w1).
Totally differentiating (21) with respect to w1 and applying the envelop theorem yield
(q1 + r)V1,1 = −(V1,11 + V1,12)u(c) + (V1,11/θ1 + V1,12/θ2)v(y)
+q1V2,1 + V1,1(q1 + r) + V1,11((q1 + r)w1 − q1w2)
−V1,2q2 + min
µ2≥0
{V1,12((q2 + r)w2 − q2w1 − µ2),
which is simplified as
0 = V1,11((q1 + r)w1 − q1w2 − u(c) + v(y)/θ1)
+ V1,12((q2 + r)w2 − q2w1 − u(c) + v(y)/θ2 − µ2) + q1V2,1 − q2V1,2.
Using dw1/dt = ((q1+r)w1−q1w2−u(c)+v(y)/θ1), and dw2/dt = ((q2+r)w2−q2w1−u(c)+v(y)/θ2−µ2),
we get
dV1,1
dt
= V1,11
dw1
dt
+ V1,12
dw2
dt
= q2V1,2 − q1V2,1.
Similarly, totally differentiating (21) with respect to w2 yields
dV1,2
dt
= q1V1,1 − q1V2,2 + (q1 − q2)V1,2.
The above equations together with dw1/dt = ((q1 + r)w1 − q1w2 − u(c) + v(y)/θ1), dw2/dt = ((q2 +
r)w2 − q2w1 − u(c) + v(y)/θ2 − µ2) constitute an ODE system to describe the dynamics with report 1:
dw1
dt
= (q1 + r)w1 − q1w2 − u(c) + v(y)/θ1(22)
dw2
dt
= (q2 + r)w2 − q2w1 − u(c) + v(y)/θ2 − µ2(23)
dV1,1
dt
= q2V1,2 − q1V2,1(24)
dV1,2
dt
= q1V1,1 − q1V2,2 + (q1 − q2)V1,2,(25)
where c = (V1,1 + V1,2), y = −(V1,1/θ1 + V1,2/θ2).(26)
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Notice that (26) comes from the minimization problems minc{c − (V1,1 + V1,2)u(c)} and miny{−y +
(V1,1/θ1 + V1,2/θ2)v(y)} and the assumption of logarithmic utility and disutility functions. Similarly,
the ODE system with report 2 is
dw1
dt
= (q1 + r)w1 − q1w2 − u(c) + v(y)/θ1 − µ1(27)
dw2
dt
= (q2 + r)w2 − q2w1 − u(c) + v(y)/θ2(28)
dV2,1
dt
= q2V2,2 − q2V1,1 + (q2 − q1)V2,1(29)
dV2,2
dt
= q1V2,1 − q2V1,2,(30)
where c = (V2,1 + V2,2), y = −(V2,1/θ1 + V2,2/θ2).(31)
Below f1 (or above f2), the slack control variable µ2 (or µ1) would be 0; i.e., V1,2 < 0 implies µ2 = 0,
and V2,1 < 0 implies µ1 = 0.
By studying the evolution of partial derivatives of the value functions (we may call them the shadow
prices of promised utilities), these two ODE systems provide plenty of information about the dynamics
of the state variable. In the next step, we use them to show that the two efficiency lines do not coincide.
In fact, line f1 is above f2, and they split the state space into three regions.
Lemma 5 Line f1 is strictly above f2, i.e., f1(w1) > (f2)−1(w1).
The following lemma characterizes how the state variable evolves with the two reports.
Lemma 6 With report 2, the time path starting from f2 will remain on f2 and move toward (∞,∞)
(see Figure 3). With report 1, the time path starting from f1 will move below f1 (see Figure 2). If the
Markov chain is symmetric (q1 = q2), then the region below f2 is absorbing. More precisely, starting
from f2 and with report 1, (w1, w2) enters the interior of the region.
Intuitively, as long as the agent claims that her productivity is low, the contract specifies a low
level of output, but in order to prevent a high-productivity agent from lying, the contract necessarily
lowers the utility of a potential liar. On one hand, this keeps incentive compatibility; on the other hand,
maintaining a low threat moves w2 below the efficient level f1(w1).8
In the absorbing region below f2, the dynamics could be summarized as a clockwise triangle. With
a high report, the state variable moves up along the efficiency line f2. It starts moving below the line
8The dynamics of the time path with a low report also imply that the optimal contract with commitment is no longer
renegotiation-proof in the environment with persistent shocks. To see this, suppose the contract starts from the line
f1, and the agent experiences a period of low shocks, then the time path moves below f1, which is w2 < f1(w1) and
V1(w1, w2) > V1(w1, f1(w1)). Should the principal have the chance to renegotiate with the agent, he would be willing
to move the state from (w1, w2) to (w1, f1(w1)); doing this makes the agent indifferent and lowers the principal’s cost.
However it violates the ex ante incentive constraints that prevent the high-productivity agent from lying.
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Figure 2: The dynamics with report 1.
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Figure 3: The dynamics with report 2.
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when a low shock arrives. It will keep moving down toward (−∞,−∞), until another high shock arrives,
which moves the state back to the efficiency line f2 by an immediate jump to the left. Then the state
variable moves up again and starts the next triangle. The next main theorem focuses on the optimal
policies along the time paths in the absorbing region.
Theorem 3 If the Markov chain is symmetric,9 i.e., q1 = q2 = q, then in the region below f2, the
following properties hold.
(i) The dynamics with a report 1 is described by an ODE system.
dw1
dt
= (q + r)w1 − qw2 − u(c) + v(y)/θ1(32)
dw2
dt
= (q + r)w2 − qw1 − u(c) + v(y)/θ2(33)
dV1,1
dt
= qV1,2(34)
dV1,2
dt
= qV1,1 − qV2,2(f2(w2), w2),(35)
where c = (V1,1 + V1,2), y = −(V1,1/θ1 + V1,2/θ2).(36)
(ii) V1(w1, w2) ≥ V2(w1, w2).
(iii) (Monotonicity of the policy functions and promised utilities) Following a report 1, both the per-
sistent and the transitional promised utilities fall, consumption falls, and output increases. The
opposite happens when following a report 2.
(iv) At a transition from 2 to 1, consumption jumps downward and output jumps downward. The
opposite happens at a transition from 1 to 2.
(v) With a report 1, the agent’s consumption-leisure decision is distorted (regardless of her previous
reports), and the distortion increases with the duration of report 1. With a report 2, there is no
consumption-leisure distortion.
(vi) (Immiserization) The inverse Euler equation holds, i.e., 1/u′(c(ιt)) = c(ιt) is a martingale. Im-
miserization still holds; consumption converges to its lower bound, and output converges to its
upper bound almost surely (a.s.).
The implications that we derive are similar to the i.i.d. case. The low-productivity agent receives
subsidy, and her future utility moves downward; while the high-productivity agent pays tax and she is
promised to be treated better in the future. The principal distorts the consumption-leisure decision of
a low-productivity agent to obtain better incentives, since in the system, a high-productivity agent has
9If the chain is asymmetric, then we cannot prove that the bottom region is absorbing. Little is known about the
dynamics of the contract in this case.
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an incentive to misreport. The optimal system makes the high-productivity agent indifferent between
truth-telling and cheating, because in equation (33), µ2 is 0.
Most of these findings are consistent with those in Williams (2008). In his private and persistent
income model, a positive innovation in the reported endowment leads to an increase in the promised
utility and vice versa. However, because the inverse Euler equation is no longer valid in Williams (2008),
the immiserization does not hold and consumption has a positive drift and increasing variability.
Remark 3 It is interesting to compare the results of this paper to those of Battaglini and Coate (2003).
Our continuous-time method can be used to study the risk-neutral utility function as well. With u(c) =
c, the value function satisfies a different type of homogeneity, i.e., Vi(w1 + λ,w2 + λ) = Vi(w1, w2) + λ,
which implies that Vi,1 + Vi,2 = 1, for i = 1, 2. A key feature in their model is that for certain pairs
of persistent and transitional promised utilities, the full information contract is implementable. This
means that there are two 45-degree lines similar to f1 and f2 (we can call them g1 and g2, and g1 is
above g2) that split the state space into three regions. In the region between the two lines, the full
information contract is implementable. However, in the region below g2, for a level w1 promised to
the low-productivity type, the transitional promised utility is forced to be below the efficiency level
(V1,2 < 0) to prevent the high-productivity agent from misreporting. Battaglini and Coate (2003)
studied the optimal contract starting from this region. They showed that once the low-productivity
agent has a transition, the contract becomes efficient by jumping leftward to line g2. Even with report
1, the state variable will eventually approach the efficiency line, implying the consumption-leisure
distortion disappears in the long run. These implications can be easily derived with continuous-time
methods. In the bottom region, V1,1 > 1, V1,2 < 0. Equation (24) implies that V1,1 is decreasing.
Since homogeneity implies that V1,1 ≥ 1 in this case, it has to be that limt→∞ V1,1(t) = 1, which
implies that the time path approaches g2. These patterns are in sharp contrast with our model with
risk-averse utility functions. In Battaglini and Coate (2003), the efficiency line g2 is absorbing, while
in Lemma 6, we show that with report 1, the state leaves the efficiency line f2 and moves farther
below it. This difference generates different implications for distortions. While they showed that the
distortion is eliminated permanently after the agent’s first report of type 2 and decreases even when the
agent always reports 1, in our model, the distortion always exists with report 1 and increases with the
duration of the report. Battaglini and Coate (2003) showed that the distortion vanishes is robust to the
introduction of small amounts of risk aversion; however, we have shown that this conclusion is reversed
when the risk aversion is large enough (in our model, we choose the log function as both utility and
disutility functions, implying that the utilities in consumption and leisure have similar risk aversions).
Risk aversion seems to be critical for the pattern of distortions, but exploring the correlation of these
two is beyond the scope of this paper and left for future research.
The monotonicity and immiserization results of the optimal contract are similar to an i.i.d. shock
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model. This suggests that, qualitatively, incentive constraints work similarly in these two models. The
difference lies in the quantitative effects of persistence. To study these effects concretely, we turn to a
numerical example.
6. A Numerical Example
In this section, we numerically solve the model with hidden productivity shocks. First we choose the
parameters so that they match observed empirical facts. Then we artificially decrease the persistence
of the productivity process (by increasing the value of q) to approach the i.i.d. shocks, and keep all
the other elements of the model fixed. We shall make comparisons between the implications of the
persistent shock model and the i.i.d. shock model.
We assume that the agent’s preferences are
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
c1−σt
1− σ − κ
y1+γt
1 + γ
/θt
)
dt
]
.(37)
We set r to 0.0408 to match an annual discount factor of 0.96. We follow Albanesi and Sleet (2006) in
setting σ and κ to be 1.461 and 1.1840 respectively, and follow Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1998) in
setting γ to be 2. This implies that the elasticity of the labor supply is 0.5. We choose parameter values
for θ1, θ2, and q to match the unconditional mean, unconditional variance, and the covariance (between
period t and t+1) of the skill process described in Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007). This implies values of
0.2652, 7.4094, and 0.0249 for θ1, θ2, and q, respectively. The productivity process is highly persistent,
which is the driving force of the pattern of wedges shown below. Notice that by i.i.d. shock model, we
specifically mean a discrete-time model with independent shocks in which one period corresponds to one
unit of time in continuous time (i.e., the discount factor β is e−r). The i.i.d. shock model will match
our continuous-time model when q = 0.5, because then the average holding times (of a productivity
state) will be equal in the two models.
6.1 The Wedges
We first define three wedges discussed in Albanesi and Sleet (2006). For a given reported history
ht−, if the agent makes a report of type i at time t, then denote consumption by ct(ht−, i) and output
by yt(ht−, i).
(i) The insurance wedge u
′(ct(ht−,1))
u′(ct(ht−,2))
−1 measures the consumption smoothing implied by the optimal
contract.
(ii) The consumption-leisure wedge u
′(ct(ht−,i))
v′(yt(ht−,i))/θi
− 1, i = 1, 2, measures the ratio of marginal utility
to marginal disutility for the type i agent at time t.
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Table 1: The Wedges in the Taxation Model
persistent i.i.d.
Insurance wedge 0.35 0.19× 10−1
Consumption-Leisure wedge (0.55 ,−0.32× 10−3) (0.9× 10−2, 0)
Intertemporal wedge (0.65× 10−2, 0.87× 10−2) (0.25× 10−3, 0.46× 10−3)
(iii) The intertemporal wedge Et[u
′(ct+1)|ιt=i]
u′(ct(ht−,i))
−1, i = 1, 2, measures the ratio of marginal utility at t+1
to marginal utility at t for the type i agent. In the above, ct+1 denotes the uncertain consumption
at t+ 1, which depends on the realization of types at t+ 1.
The wedges defined above measure the degree of insurance from different dimensions. It is easy to see
that in the full-information allocation, all the wedges should be 0. The larger the wedge, the worse the
insurance is, and the larger the distortion is in the allocation.
6.2 Numerical Results
In order to study the wedge patterns in the model, we pick an endogenous state variable (w1, w2) =
(−60.9024,−59.5591), and then report values of the three wedges at this point. This particular choice of
the state is not essential for the pattern reported in Table 1.10 We can see from the table that the per-
sistent shock model implies a much larger insurance wedge and consumption-leisure wedge (with report
1). It is also helpful to draw these wedges as functions of q. The insurance wedge and consumption-
leisure wedge both decrease rapidly with the decrease in persistence (see Figure 4).11 These findings
are broadly consistent with those in Williams (2008). In a hidden income model, he found that the
agent’s exposure to risk depends positively on the persistence of the information. With less persistence
(bigger q), the exposure is smaller, and the consumption is better smoothed (i.e., smaller wedges).
A distinctive feature of the results from the i.i.d. shock model is that all the wedges are close to zero.
This implies that the allocation with the i.i.d. shocks is close to the full information (the first-best)
allocation. The intuition for the results is as follows. Given that the discount factor e−r is close to 1,
the agent cares about her utility as the long-run average. If the shocks are i.i.d. and thus transitory,
10The state is chosen to match the utility level that the agent can achieve in autarky in the i.i.d. case. Choosing other
levels of promised utilities would not change the results reported in Table 1 significantly. Alternatively, we could calculate
averages of the wedges in the long run. Because of the immiserization result, the system does not imply a steady-state
distribution of the state variable, so we need to impose a lower bound on the state variable to obtain a steady state. Using
the averages would not change the pattern of the wedges either. See Zhang (2006).
11Since the consumption-leisure wedge with report 2 and the intertemporal wedge remain small for all levels of q, we
do not draw them in the figure.
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Figure 4: The wedges as functions of q.
the effect of any productivity shock at t is small and will be smoothed into many periods in the future.
If the agent has a bad shock, the principal will still provide the consumption level close to that of the
high-productivity agent but will lower the discounted utility from t+ 1 on. In the long run, by the law
of large numbers, the effects of high- and low-productivity shocks cancel out, and the agent does not
experience large deviations from the first-best allocation. The intertemporal taxation and subsidy play
an essential role in the optimal contract to smooth consumption.
The patterns of wedges with persistent shocks are significantly different from the i.i.d. shock model.
We see that the insurance wedge is more than ten times bigger than the wedge in the i.i.d. case,
implying that the consumption smoothing is far from being perfect. The consumption-leisure wedge
is also quantitatively large, meaning that the low-productivity agent is distorted in her consumption-
leisure decision. Despite this, the persistent shock model does not imply a large intertemporal wedge.
To understand these patterns, it would be helpful to consider the permanent-shock model, which is the
opposite extreme of the i.i.d. shocks. Suppose that the agent initially has a permanent productivity
shock that is only privately observed. Then the optimal allocation requires a type-specific but constant
stream of consumption and output for each type. It is well known that the optimal allocation implies
consumption-leisure distortion only for the low-productivity agent. The intertemporal wedge is 0 simply
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because the consumption process is deterministic. Our results show that the pattern of wedges with
persistent shocks is similar to a permanent shock model. Quantitatively, this is driven by the low value
of q. The productivity process is so persistent that it is almost permanent.12
7. Concluding Remarks
This paper studies a continuous-time version of the dynamic taxation model with persistent shocks.
Merely putting the problem in continuous time rather than in discrete time would not generate new
economic implications; however, many implications that are difficult to obtain in a discrete-time model
can be derived in its continuous-time analogue. The differential equations in Section 3 and the phase-
diagram analysis in Section 5 provide a lot of information about the properties of the optimal contract.
The advantages of the continuous-time method come from the fact that the phase-diagram analysis is
traditionally carried out using differential equations, thus there are more mathematical tools available.
Our results are derived under several restrictive assumptions. First, since we use the recursive
formulation in Fernandes and Phelan (2000), the dimension of the state vector is equal to the number of
states in the agent’s private information process. If the process is a diffusion process (with a continuum of
possible states), then our state variable will be infinite dimensional, thus making it extremely difficult to
study the dynamics of the contract. In this paper, we limit our attention to the case of two shocks, where
the phase-diagram analysis is still tractable. Second, we use logarithmic utility and disutility functions.
In APPENDIX C, we extend our results to functional forms including c
1−σ
1−σ and − exp(−σc), but some
form of homogeneity is indispensable (note that the qualitative analysis in the i.i.d. case also assumes
some form of homogeneity; for example, see Atkeson and Lucas (1992)). With the homogeneity property,
the efficiency curves f1 and f2 are straight lines (see Figures 2, 3), thus we can easily show that f1 is
above f2 and they split the state space into three regions. This greatly simplifies the analysis. Without
the homogeneity property, f1 and f2 could be curves and (in principle) could intersect multiple times
and separate the state space into many small regions, making the phase-diagram analysis intractable.
Third, when we show that the bottom region is absorbing, an additional assumption of symmetry is
used. This assumption helps us to show that, when the system starts on f2 with report 1, dw1 < 0
and the slope of the path (dw2dw1 ) is bigger than that of f2, thus the region below f2 absorbs this path.
It is still unclear whether the bottom region is absorbing when the Markov chain is asymmetric. We
view our paper as the first step toward understanding the implication of persistent shocks and leave
this question and further generalizations for future research.
12Similar effects of persistent shocks can be observed in other dynamic models as well. For example, in incomplete
market model with idiosyncratic income shocks, a persistent shock changes future expected income more than a temporary
shock does, thus has a greater effect on a consumer’s consumption-saving behavior.
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APPENDIX A: Proofs of Main Results
Proof of Lemma 1: We prove only the right-hand limits, since the proofs for the left-hand limits
are similar. Let −B be a lower bound on the instantaneous disutility; for example, we could define
B = v¯/θ1. We first prove a preliminary result,
wi(ht−) ≥ wi(ht−, j[t,s))e−r(s−t)e−qi(s−t) − B
r
(
1− e−r(s−t)e−qi(s−t)
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.(38)
Consider a type i agent who reports j from time t to s and tells the truth from s onward if her type is
still i. Her strategies in other contingencies need not be specified. The payoff from this strategy is at
least ∫ s
t
e−r(x−t)(−B)dx+ e−r(s−t)
[
e−qi(s−t)wi(ht−, j[t,s)) + (1− e−qi(s−t))−B
r
]
,
since with probability e−qi(s−t), her type remains i, and with probability (1− e−qi(s−t)), she obtains at
least the lower bound. The above is the right side of (38), and since the contact is I.C., utility from
truth-telling is higher.
Conditional on ιt = i, the holding time S1 (it first leaves state i at time t + S1) is an exponential
random variable of parameter qi. Let A = {ω ∈ Ω : ω(t) = i, t + S1 ≥ s}, AC = {ω ∈ Ω : ω(t) =
i, t+ S1 < s},
wi(ht−) = Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(x−t)
[
u(cx(ht−, ω[t,x]))− v(yx(ht−, ω[t,x]))/θω(x)
]
dx
∣∣∣ω(t) = i]
= Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(x−t)
[
u(cx(ht−, ω[t,x]))− v(yx(ht−, ω[t,x]))/θω(x)
]
dx
∣∣∣A] .Pr(A|i)
+ Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(x−t)
[
u(cx(ht−, ω[t,x]))− v(yx(ht−, ω[t,x]))/θω(x)
]
dx
∣∣∣AC] .Pr(AC |i)
=
[∫ s
t
e−r(x−t)
[
u(cx(ht−, i[t,x]))− v(yx(ht−, i[t,x]))/θi
]
dx+ e−r(s−t)wi(ht−, i[t,s))
]
.Pr(A|i)
+ Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(x−t)
[
u(cx(ht−, ω[t,x]))− v(yx(ht−, ω[t,x]))/θω(x)
]
dx
∣∣∣AC] .Pr(AC |i).
Since Pr(A|i) = exp(qi(s−t)),Pr(AC |i) = 1−exp(qi(s−t)), letting s ↓ t, we see that lims↓t wi(ht−, i[t,s))
exists and equals wi(ht−). The inequality (7) follows directly from the inequality (38). The only issue left
is the existence of lims↓t wj(ht−, i[t,s)), when j 6= i. By contradiction, suppose lim sups↓t wj(ht−, i[t,s)) >
lim infs↓t wj(ht−, i[t,s)). Then there is a ² > 0, such that for all δ > 0, we can find t < s1 < s2 < t+ δ,
such that wj(ht−, i[t,s1)) < wj(ht−, i[t,s2)) − ². But this would be a contradiction to inequality (38)
when s2 is close to s1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1:
(i) (necessity) The proof is divided into three steps: in step (a), we show that wi(hs−) is differentiable
a.e.; in step (b), we derive equation (39) as a continuous-time analog of equation (12); in step (c),
we take limits in equation (39) to finish the proof.
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(a) We first show that wi(hs−) has, at most, countable discontinuous points, is of bounded
variation, and thus is differentiable a.e. Define
V +(x) = sup
{
n∑
k=1
(wi(htk−)− wi(htk−1−))+ : P = {t0, ..., tn} is a partition of [0, x)
}
,
V −(x) = sup
{
n∑
k=1
(wi(htk−)− wi(htk−1−))− : P = {t0, ..., tn} is a partition of [0, x)
}
.
We show that V +(x) <∞. Recall from equation (38),
wi(htk−1−) ≥ wi(htk−)e−(r+qi)(tk−tk−1) − B
r
(1− e−(r+qi)(tk−tk−1)).
Hence
(wi(htk−)− wi(htk−1−))+ ≤
((
wi(htk−) +
B
r
)(
1− e−(r+qi)(tk−tk−1)
))+
≤ 2B
r
(r + qi)(tk − tk−1).
Therefore, V +(x) ≤ 2Br (r + qi)x. Since V +(x) − V −(x) = wi(hx−) − wi(h0−), V −(x)
is also finite. It is easy to verify that both V + and V − are monotonic functions, and
V + is continuous. Although V − could be discontinuous, Theorem 29.7 in Aliprantis and
Burkinshaw (1990) asserts that a monotonic function has, at most, countable discontinuities.
Since the difference of two monotonic functions is of bounded variation, wi(hs−) has bounded
variation and, by Theorem 29.11 in Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1990), wi is differentiable
on path ht− a.e.
(b) Pick s ∈ [tk, tk+1), such that wj is differentiable for all 1 ≤ j ≤ N at s. Conditional on
ω(s) = i = ik, the holding time S1 (it first leaves state i at time s + S1) is an exponential
random variable of parameter qi. For any a > s,
wi(hs−)
= Es
[∫ ∞
s
e−r(x−s)
[
u(c(hs−, ω[s,x]))− v(y(hs−, ω[s,x]))/θω(x)
]
dx
∣∣∣ω(s) = i]
= Es
[∫ (s+S1)∧a
s
e−r(x−s)
[
u(c(hs−, i[s,x]))− v(y(hs−, i[s,x]))/θi
]
dx
∣∣∣ω(s) = i]
+Es
[∫ ∞
(s+S1)∧a
e−r(x−s)
[
u(c(hs−, ω[s,x]))− v(y(hs−, ω[s,x]))/θω(x)
]
dx
∣∣∣ω(s) = i] .
By Fubini’s theorem, the first term on the right is
Es
[∫ (s+S1)∧a
s
e−r(x−s)
[
u(c(hs−, i[s,x]))− v(y(hs−, i[s,x]))/θi
]
dx
∣∣∣ω(s) = i]
= Es
[∫ a
s
χ{S1≥(x−s)}e
−r(x−s)
[
u(c(hs−, i[s,x]))− v(y(hs−, i[s,x]))/θi
]
dx
∣∣∣ω(s) = i]
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=
∫ a
s
e−r(x−s)
[
u(c(hs−, i[s,x]))− v(y(hs−, i[s,x]))/θi
]
Es
[
χ{S1≥(x−s)}
∣∣∣ω(s) = i] dx
=
∫ a
s
e−(r+qi)(x−s)(u(c(hs−, i[s,x]))− v(y(hs−, i[s,x]))/θi)dx,
where χ in the second line is the indicator function. Let A = {ω ∈ Ω : ω(s) = i, s+ S1 ≥ a},
AC = {ω ∈ Ω : ω(s) = i, s+ S1 < a}, then the second term is
Es
[∫ ∞
(s+S1)∧a
e−r(x−s)
[
u(c(hs−, ω[s,x]))− v(y(hs−, ω[s,x]))/θω(x)
]
dx
∣∣∣ω(s) = i]
= Es
[∫ ∞
a
e−r(x−s)
[
u(c(hs−, ω[s,x]))− v(y(hs−, ω[s,x]))/θω(x)
]
dx
∣∣∣A] .Pr(A|i)
+Es
[
χAC
∫ ∞
s+S1
e−r(x−s)
[
u(c(hs−, ω[s,x]))− v(y(hs−, ω[s,x]))/θω(x)
]
dx
∣∣∣ω(s) = i]
= e−r(a−s)wi(hs−, i[s,a))e−qi(a−s) + Es
χACe−rS1∑
j 6=i
qij
qi
wj(hs−, i[s,s+S1))
∣∣∣ω(s) = i

= e−(r+qi)(a−s)wi(hs−, i[s,a)) +
∫ a
s
e−(r+qi)(x−s)
∑
j 6=i
qijwj(hs−, i[s,x))dx.
It follows that
wi(hs−) =
∫ a
s
e−(r+qi)(x−s)(u(c(hs−, i[s,x]))− v(y(hs−, i[s,x]))/θi)dx
+e−(r+qi)(a−s)wi(hs−, i[s,a)) +
∫ a
s
e−(r+qi)(x−s)
∑
j 6=i
qijwj(hs−, i[s,x))dx.(39)
(c) By assumption, lima→s
wi(h
s−,i[s,a))−wi(hs−)
a−s exists, and lima→s wj(h
s−, i[s,a)) = wj(hs−),
for all j. Furthermore, since c(hs−, i[s,x]) and y(hs−, i[s,x]) are measurable functions of x,
Theorem 29.4 in Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1990) states
lim
a→s
1
a− s
∫ a
s
e−(r+qi)(x−s)(u(c(hs−, i[s,x]))−v(y(hs−, i[s,x]))/θi)dx = u(c(hs))−v(y(hs))/θi,
for a.e. s. We now have
lim
a→s
wi(hs−, i[s,a))− wi(hs−)
a− s
= lim
a→s
1− e−(r+qi)(a−s)
a− s wi(h
s−, i[s,a))− lim
a→s
1
a− s
∫ a
s
e−(r+qi)(x−s)
∑
j 6=i
qijwj(hs−, i[s,x))dx
− lim
a→s
1
a− s
∫ a
s
e−(r+qi)(x−s)(u(c(hs−, i[s,x]))− v(y(hs−, i[s,x]))/θi)dx
= (r + qi)wi(hs−)−
∑
j 6=i
qijwj(hs−)− (u(c(hs))− v(y(hs))/θi), for a.e. s.
If i 6= ik, the proof for inequality (11) is similar to the above. Since a type i agent could misreport
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ik up to (s+ S1) ∧ a, and starts truth-telling after (s+ S1) ∧ a, I.C. implies
wi(hs−) ≥
∫ a
s
e−r(x−s)e−qi(x−s)(u(c(hs−, ik[s,x]))− v(y(hs−, ik[s,x]))/θi)dx
+ e−(r+qi)(a−s)wi(hs−, ik[s,a)) +
∫ a
s
e−(r+qi)(x−s)
∑
j 6=i
qijwj(hs−, ik[s,x))dx.
Taking limit yields
lim
a→s
wi(hs−, ik[s,a))− wi(hs−)
a− s ≤ (r + qi)wi(h
s−)−
∑
j 6=i
qijwj(hs−)− (u(c(hs))− v(y(hs))/θi).
(ii) (sufficiency) By using Dynkin’s formula (see, for example, Fleming and Soner (2006, Appendix B)),
we first represent the state variable wi(ht−) as the sum of the discounted value of (u(c)− v(y)/θ)
and the discounted value of slack control variable µ. Then we show that for truth-telling, the
discounted value of µ is 0, thus truth-telling achieves wi(ht−).
The Dynkin formula states that for a stochastic process w(t) (possibly multidimensional) driven
by
dw(t)
dt
= f(t, w(t), ιt),
and for a real-valued smooth function Φ(t, w, ιt), the following equality holds
Et [Φ(s, w(s), ιs)] = Φ(t, w(t), ιt) + Et
[∫ s
t
AΦ(x,w(x), ιx)dx
]
, s > t,
where
AΦ(x,w(x), ιx) =
∂Φ
∂x
+ f(x,w(x), ιx)
∂Φ
∂w
+
∑
j 6=ιx
qιxj [Φ(x,w(x), j)− Φ(x,w(x), ιx)].
Given the current state (wi(ht−))1≤i≤N and a strategy σ, according to equations (10) and (11),
the process w(σ(ht−, ω[t,s))) evolves as
dwi(σ(ht−, ω[t,s)))
ds
= (r + qi)wi(σ(ht−, ω[t,s)))−
∑
j 6=i
qijwj(σ(ht−, ω[t,s)))
− (u(c(σ(ht−, ω[t,s])))− v(y(σ(ht−, ω[t,s])))/θi)− µi(σ(ht−, ω[t,s])),
where µi(σ(ht−, ω[t,s])) = 0, if σs(ht−, ω[t,s]) = i. Define Φ(s, w, ιs) = e−r(s−t)wιs . By Dynkin’s
formula,
Et [Φ(s, w(s), ιs)] = Φ(t, w(t), ιt) + Et
[∫ s
t
AΦ(x,w(x), ιx)dx
]
.
Taking limit s→∞ and using the fact that w is bounded, we have
0 = wιt(h
t−) + Et
[∫ ∞
t
AΦ(x,w(σ(ht−, ω[t,x))), ιx)dx
]
,
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where
AΦ = −re−r(x−t)wιx(σ(ht−, ω[t,x))) + e−r(x−t)
(
dwιx(σ(h
t−, ω[t,x)))
dx
)
+
∑
j 6=ιx
e−r(x−t)qιxj [wj(σ(h
t−, ω[t,x)))− wιx(σ(ht−, ω[t,x)))]
= −e−r(x−t)(u(c(σ(ht−, ω[t,x])))− v(y(σ(ht−, ω[t,x])))/θιx)− e−r(x−t)µιx(σ(ht−, ω[t,x])).
Thus,
wιt(h
t−) = Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(x−t)(u(c(σ(ht−, ω[t,x])))− v(y(σ(ht−, ω[t,x])))/θιx)dx
]
+ Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(x−t)µιx(σ(h
t−, ω[t,x]))dx
]
.
Since µ is nonnegative, the payoff from any strategy σ is weakly below wιt(h
t−). If σ = σ∗, then
the second term is 0, and truth-telling achieves wιt(h
t−).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2: We verify two things. First, any point between the two boundaries can
be implemented by some contract. Second, any point either above the upper boundary or below the
lower boundary cannot be implemented by any contract.
From the definition of boundary curves, any point on the boundary can be implemented. To
implement a point (w1, w2) between the two boundaries, the principal may start with the policy
(ct, yt) = (0, 0), and let the promised utilities evolve according to the following differential equations,
dw1
dt
= (q1 + r)w1 − q1w2
dw2
dt
= (q2 + r)w2 − q2w1,
until time s∗, the time when the path hits some point (w∗1 , w
∗
2) on the boundary. Then starting from
s∗, the principal implements (w∗1 , w
∗
2) using the contracts that define the boundary curves.
Second, we will show that any point below the lower boundary cannot be implemented by any
contract. The proof for points above the upper boundary is analogous. Let function g : [−x1v¯, u¯/r]→
[−x2v¯, u¯/r] be the lower boundary of W . Pick a point (w1, w2) with w2 < g(w1) and a contract C . We
will prove that the continuation utility will eventually be impossible to implement under the history of
reporting type 1 for a long time. To see this, let us calculate the distance between the lower boundary
and the continuation utility (w1(1[0,t)), w2(1[0,t))) under contract C . Recall
dw1
dt
= (q1 + r)w1 − q1w2 − u(ct) + v(yt)/θ1,
dw2
dt
= (q2 + r)w2 − q2w1 − u(ct) + v(yt)/θ2 − µ2.
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The distance between w2 and g(w1) satisfies
d(g(w1)− w2)
dt
≥ dg(w1)
dw1
((q1 + r)w1 − q1w2 − u(ct) + v(yt)/θ1)
− ((q2 + r)w2 − q2w1 − u(ct) + v(yt)/θ2)
=
dg(w1)
dw1
((q1 + r)w1 − q1w2)− ((q2 + r)w2 − q2w1)
+
(
dg(w1)
dw1
/θ1 − 1/θ2
)
v(yt) +
(
1− dg(w1)
dw1
)
u(ct).
Since θ1θ2 ≤
dg(w1)
dw1
≤ 1 and w2 ≤ g(w1),
d(g(w1)− w2)
dt
≥ dg(w1)
dw1
((q1 + r)w1 − q1g(w1))− ((q2 + r)w2 − q2w1)
= ((q2 + r)g(w1)− q2w1)− ((q2 + r)w2 − q2w1)
= (q2 + r)(g(w1)− w2).
Therefore, the distance is increasing exponentially and, in finite time, w2 will be less than −x2v¯. This is
a contradiction because the worst scenario for the θ2 type agent is “consumption 0 and maximal output
y¯,” which provides utility −x2v¯. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: We give a proof only for V1, since the proof for V2 is the same.
(i) It is because (c∗t , y∗t )t≥0 is the optimal contract to implement (w1, w2) if and only if (exp(λ)c∗t , exp(λ)y∗t )t≥0
is the optimal contract for (w1 + (1/r + x1)λ,w2 + (1/r + x2)λ).
(ii) This follows from the fact that the contracting problem has a convex objective function and a
linear constraint set when the control variables are u and v. For λ ∈ [0, 1], pick two implementable
pairs (w1, w2), (w′1, w
′
2). Suppose C ,C
′ implement (w1, w2) and (w′1, w
′
2), respectively; then the
convex combination of C and C ′ will implement λ(w1, w2) + (1 − λ)(w′1, w′2). The new contract
(λu(c(ht))+(1−λ)u(c′(ht)), λv(y(ht))+(1−λ)v(y′(ht))) will still be I.C., because the differential
equation conditions in Theorem 1 hold after the convex combination.
(iii) We show V1,2 ≤ 0 first. Pick (w1, w2) and (w′1, w′2) with w1 = w′1, w2 < w′2. Notice that initially
the type is 1, so the evolution of (w′1, w
′
2) is controlled by
dw′1
dt
= (q1 + r)w′1 − q1w′2 − u(ct) + v(yt)/θ1,
dw′2
dt
= (q2 + r)w′2 − q2w′1 − u(ct) + v(yt)/θ2 − µ2.
By picking µ2(0) = ∞, the system could jump to (w1, w2) immediately, and then follow the
consumption-output plan starting from (w1, w2). Thus V1(w′1, w
′
2) ≤ V1(w1, w2). To see that
V1,1 > 0, differentiating equation (20) at λ = 0, we have
V1(w1, w2) = V1,1(w1, w2)(1/r + x1) + V1,2(w1, w2)(1/r + x2).(40)
It follows from V1 > 0, V1,2 ≤ 0 that V1,1 > 0.
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: We give a proof only for V1, since the proof for V2 is the same. We will
need several preliminary results. First, let V¯i(wi) be the first-best cost function if the shock is public
information and the agent starts with initial state i and promised utility wi, i = 1, 2. It is obvious that
for all w1, w2,
V1(w1, w2) ≥ V¯1(w1), V2(w1, w2) ≥ V¯2(w2).
Second, using the same proof as that in proving equation (39), we can show, for t > 0,
V1(w1, w2) =
∫ t
0
e−(r+q1)s(c(1[0,s])− y(1[0,s]))ds+ e−(r+q1)tV1(w1(1[0,t)), w2(1[0,t)))
+
∫ t
0
e−(r+q1)sq1V2(w1(1[0,s)), w2(1[0,s)))ds,(41)
where c(1[0,s]), y(1[0,s]) are the optimal control variables and w1(1[0,s)), w2(1[0,s)) are the time paths of
the state variables under the optimal control. Both the control variables and the time paths implicitly
depend the initial state (w1, w2).
Third, if a > 0, b > 0 are two numbers, and B > 0 is an upper bound for
∫ t
0
e−asc(s)ds, then∫ t
0
e−bsu(c(s))ds ≤
∫ t
0
e−bsc(s)ds ≤ e(a+b)tB.(42)
Similarly, if B > 0 is an upper bound for
∫ t
0
e−as(−y(s))ds, then∫ t
0
e−bsv(c(s))ds ≥
∫ t
0
e−bsy(s)ds ≥ −e(a+b)tB.(43)
(i) To show {w2 ∈ R : V1,2(w1, w2) < 0} 6= ∅, it suffices to show that limw2→−∞ V1(w1, w2) = ∞,
since V1 is a (weakly) convex and decreasing function of w2. By contradiction, assume that there
is B > 0, such that limw2→−∞ V1(w1, w2) ≤ B. Starting at (w1, w2), the evolution with report 1
is  dw1dt
dw2
dt
 =
 q1 + r −q1
−q2 q2 + r
 w1
w2
+
 −u(ct) + v(yt)/θ1
−u(ct) + v(yt)/θ2 − µ2
 .
Since
 q1 + r −q1
−q2 q2 + r
 =
 − q2q1+q2 q2q1+q2
q2
q1+q2
q1
q1+q2
−1 q1 + q2 + r 0
0 r
 − q2q1+q2 q2q1+q2
q2
q1+q2
q1
q1+q2
,
we can solve the equation and obtain
w1(1[0,t)) =
q1
q1 + q2
w1e
(q1+q2+r)t +
q2
q1 + q2
w1e
rt − q1
q1 + q2
w2(e(q1+q2+r)t − ert)
+
q1
q1 + q2
∫ t
0
e(q1+q2+r)(t−s)(1/θ1 − 1/θ2)v(y(1[0,s]))ds(44)
+
∫ t
0
er(t−s)
(
−u(c(1[0,s])) +
(
q2/θ1
q1 + q2
+
q1/θ2
q1 + q2
)
v(y(1[0,s]))
)
ds
+
q1
q1 + q2
∫ t
0
(e(q1+q2+r)(t−s) − er(t−s))µ2(1[0,s])ds.
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Fix t and w1, and let w2 → −∞. Equation (41) and supw2 V1(w1, w2) ≤ B imply that
∫ t
0
e−(r+q1)s(c(1[0,s])−
y(1[0,s]))ds is uniformly (when w2 varies) bounded by B. Using (42),(43), we see that the fourth
and fifth terms on the right of (44) are bounded from below. Since the first and second terms are
fixed, and the last term is nonnegative, taking limit in (44) yields
lim
w2→−∞
w1(1[0,t)) = ∞.
Using (41), we see that, as w2 → −∞,
V1(w1, w2) ≥ e−(r+q1)tV1(w1(1[0,t)), w2(1[0,t))) ≥ e−(r+q1)tV¯1(w1(1[0,t)))→∞.
(ii) To show that {w2 ∈ R : V1,2(w1, w2) = 0} 6= ∅, by contradiction, suppose V1,2(w1, w2) < 0 for all
w2. Then with report 1, the slack variable µ2 = 0, the system is
dw1
dt
= (q1 + r)w1 − q1w2 − u(ct) + v(yt)/θ1,
dw2
dt
= (q2 + r)w2 − q2w1 − u(ct) + v(yt)/θ2.
Fix t and w1. Pick w∗2 and B such that e
−(r+q1)tV¯1(B) ≥ V1(w1, w∗2). If w2 ≥ w∗2 , then
V1(w1, w2) ≤ V1(w1, w∗2) and equation (41) imply that
sup
w2∈[w∗2 ,∞)
sup
s∈[0,t]
w1(1[0,s)) ≤ B.(45)
We can solve the differential equation and obtain, for s ∈ [0, t],
q2w1(1[0,s)) + q1w2(1[0,s)) = (q2w1 + q1w2)ers −
∫ s
0
er(s−x)(q1 + q2)u(c(1[0,x]))dx
+
∫ s
0
er(s−x)(q2/θ1 + q1/θ2)v(y(1[0,x]))dx.
Since
∫ s
0
e−(r+q1)x(c(1[0,x])− y(1[0,x]))dx ≤ V1(w1, w2) ≤ V1(w1, w∗2), (42) and (43) imply
−
∫ s
0
er(s−x)(q1 + q2)u(c(1[0,x]))dx ≥ −ert(q1 + q2)e(2r+q1)tV1(w1, w∗2),∫ s
0
er(s−x)(q2/θ1 + q1/θ2)v(y(1[0,x]))dx ≥ −ert(q2/θ1 + q1/θ2)e(2r+q1)tV1(w1, w∗2).
The above two inequalities and (45) yield
q1w2(1[0,s)) ≥ (q2w1 + q1w2)ers − ert(q1 + q2)e(2r+q1)tV1(w1, w∗2)
− ert(q2/θ1 + q1/θ2)e(2r+q1)tV1(w1, w∗2)− q2B,
thus infs∈[0,t] w2(1[0,s))→∞ as w2 →∞. This and (41) imply, as w2 →∞,
V1(w1, w2) ≥
∫ t
0
e−(r+q1)sq1V2(w1(1[0,s)), w2(1[0,s)))ds
≥
∫ t
0
e−(r+q1)sq1V¯2(w2(1[0,s)))ds→∞,
which contradicts our assumption that V1,2(w1, w2) < 0 for all w2.
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: (41) implies that
V1(w1(ht−), w2(ht−)) = lim
s↓t
V1(w1(ht−, 1[t,s)), w2(ht−, 1[t,s)))(46)
= V1(w1(ht−), lim
s↓t
w2(ht−, 1[t,s))).
When w2(ht−) > f1(w1(ht−)),
V1(w1(ht−), f1(w1(ht−))) = V1(w1(ht−), w2(ht−)) = V1(w1(ht−), lim
s↓t
w2(ht−, 1[t,s))).
Thus lims↓t w2(ht−, 1[t,s)) ≥ f1(w1(ht−)). If lims↓t w2(ht−, 1[t,s)) > f1(w1(ht−)), then the contracts
starting from (w1(ht−), w2(ht−)) and (w1(ht−), f1(w1(ht−))) cannot be equal to each other almost surely
(a.s.). Convex combination can be used to lower the cost at (w1(ht−), w2(ht−)/2+f1(w1(ht−))/2). This
contradicts the fact that V1(w1, w2) = V1(w1, f1(w1)), for all w2 ≥ f1(w1).
Next we show that for all s > t, w2(ht−, 1[t,s)) ≤ f1(w1(ht−, 1[t,s))). This implies that, once the state
variable jumps onto the efficiency line, it stays on or below it forever, unless a new transition occurs,
which may require the state variable to jump to the other efficiency line. By contradiction, suppose for
some s > t, w2(ht−, 1[t,s)) > f1(w1(ht−, 1[t,s))). Since lims′↑s w2(ht−, 1[t,s
′)) ≥ w2(ht−, 1[t,s)), and w2 is
continuous a.e., we can find an s′ < s, such that
w2(ht−, 1[t,s
′)) > f1(ht−, 1[t,s
′)) and w2 is continuous at s′.
At s′, the time path is continuous and above the efficiency line f1, thus does not immediately jump
onto it, which is a contradiction to what we have shown in the first step.
Last, we show that w2(ht−, 1[t,s)) = lims′↓s w2(ht−, 1[t,s
′)). Now the state is below the efficiency line
and, by definition, V1,2 < 0 in this region. w2(ht−, 1[t,s)) > lims′↓s w2(ht−, 1[t,s
′)) contradicts equation
(46). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: By contradiction, first suppose that f2 is above f1, i.e., f1(w1) < (f2)−1(w1).
Lemma 7 in APPENDIX B implies that V1,1(w1, w2)−V2,2(w1, w2) is strictly decreasing in w2, which
implies
V1,1(w1, f1(w1))− V2,2(w1, f1(w1)) > V1,1(w1, (f2)−1(w1))− V2,2(w1, (f2)−1(w1)),
which contradicts Lemma 8 in APPENDIX B.
Next, suppose that f1 and f2 coincide, i.e., f1(w1) = (f2)−1(w1). At (w1, f1(w1)), the definition
of the efficiency lines and Lemma 8 imply that V1,2 = V2,1 = 0, V1,12 = V1,22 = V2,11 = V2,12 = 0,
V1,1 = V2,2 > 0. Using equation (24),(25) with report 1, we find
V1,11
dw1
dt
= V1,11
dw1
dt
+ V1,12
dw2
dt
=
dV1,1
dt
= q2V1,2 − q1V2,1 = 0
V1,22
dw2
dt
= V1,21
dw1
dt
+ V1,22
dw2
dt
=
dV1,2
dt
= q1V1,1 − q1V2,2 + (q1 − q2)V1,2 = 0,
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therefore dw1(1
[0,t))
dt |t=0 = dw2(1
[0,t))
dt |t=0 = 0. Similarly, with report 2, the state variable does not move
either. However, we know that V1,1 + V1,2 = V2,1 + V2,2 and V1,1/θ1 + V1,2/θ2 > V2,1/θ1 + V2,2/θ2 on
f1. Using (26),(31), we see that c1 = c2,−y1 > −y2, which gives a contradiction,
0 =
dw2(1[0,t))
dt
|t=0 = (q2 + r)w2 − q2w1 − u(c1) + v(y1)/θ2 − µ2
≤ (q2 + r)w2 − q2w1 − u(c1) + v(y1)/θ2
< (q2 + r)w2 − q2w1 − u(c2) + v(y2)/θ2
=
dw2(2[0,t))
dt
|t=0 = 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6: We first show that starting from (f2(w2), w2), with report 2, w1(2[0,t)) =
f2(w2(2[0,t))), for all t ≥ 0. Lemma 10 in APPENDIX B states that V1,1 = V2,2 on f2. Lemma 7 in
APPENDIX B implies that V1,1 < V2,2 if w1 < f2(w2). If the state moves to the left of f2, solving
equation (29) yields
V2,1(w1(2[0,t)), w2(2[0,t)))− e(q2−q1)tV2,1(f2(w2), w2)
=
∫ t
0
e(q2−q1)(t−s)q2(V2,2(w1(2[0,s)), w2(2[0,s)))− V1,1(w1(2[0,s)), w2(2[0,s))))ds > 0,
which contradicts V2,1 ≤ 0 from part (iii) in Lemma 2. Therefore, the state variable remains on the
efficiency line f2 with report 2. Furthermore, equation (30) and the fact that V2,1 = 0, V1,2 < 0 on f2,
imply that
V2,22
dw2
dt
= V2,21
dw1
dt
+ V2,22
dw2
dt
=
dV2,2
dt
= q1V2,1 − q2V1,2 > 0,
therefore dw2/dt > 0 and the state moves up along f2.
Lemma 10 in APPENDIX B states that V1,1 < V2,2, V1,2 = 0 on f1. With report 1 and starting
from the line f1, equation (25) implies that
dV1,2
dt
= q1V1,1 − q1V2,2 + (q1 − q2)V1,2 < 0,
which means that the time path leaves f1 and moves below f1.
To understand the pattern when the report is θ1 and the state starts from f2, assume that q1 =
q2 = q > 0. Equation (25) is
V1,21
dw1
dt
+ V1,22
dw2
dt
=
dV1,2
dt
= qV1,1 − qV2,2 = 0.
Therefore, starting from f2, dw2dw1 = −V1,21/V1,22. Substituting into equation (24), we find
0 > qV1,2 =
dV1,1
dt
= V1,11
dw1
dt
+ V1,12
dw2
dt
= V1,11
dw1
dt
(
1− V1,12V1,21
V1,11V1,22
)
.
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It follows from the convexity of V1 (V1,12V1,21 ≤ V1,11V1,22) that dw1/dt < 0. Equation (48) and V1,2 < 0
on f2 imply that −V1,21/V1,22 > (1/r + x2)/(1/r + x1), thus dw2/dw1 is larger than the slope of f2
((1/r + x2)/(1/r + x1)). So the time path of (w1, w2) will move southwest, and be below f2, and thus
will enter the interior of the region. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3:
(i) This follows from the system described in equations (22), (23), (24), (25), (26). Notice that in the
region below f2, V2,1(w1, w2) = 0 and V2,2(w1, w2) = V2,2(f2(w2), w2). That µ2 = 0 follows from
V1,2 < 0.
(ii) This follows from Lemma 9 and Lemma 10 in APPENDIX B.
(iii) We provide a proof only for a report 1. Since V1,2 < 0 and V1,1 > V2,2, equations (34),(35) imply
that V1,1 decreases and V1,2 increases. Now we show that dw2/dt < 0 for all t. Suppose this is not
the case, since initially dw2/dt < 0, there is some t∗,
dw2(t)
dt
∣∣∣
t=t∗
= 0. Equation (34) and V1,11 > 0
imply that dw1(t)dt
∣∣∣
t=t∗
< 0. If f denotes the straight line that passes (w1(t∗), w2(t∗)) and is below
but parallel to f2, then this implies that the time path moves leftward and crosses f from below.
Since the time path starts from f2, it has to cross f from above at least once before. The time
path crosses f from different directions twice, contradicting equation (19). A similar argument
shows that dw1/dt < 0 for all t.
Next, we will show that V1,1(t) + V1,2(t) is strictly decreasing in t. Adding (34) and (35) yields
d(V1,1 + V1,2)
dt
= qV1,2 + qV1,1 − qV2,2(f2(w2), w2).(47)
Thus it suffices to show that V1,1(t) + V1,2(t) < V2,2(f2(w2(t)), w2(t)), for all t ≥ 0. By contradic-
tion, suppose at some time t∗, V1,1(t∗) + V1,2(t∗) ≥ V2,2(f2(w2(t∗)), w2(t∗)). For t∗∗ > t∗, solving
(47) yields
(V1,1 + V1,2)(t∗∗) = eq(t
∗∗−t∗)(V1,1 + V1,2)(t∗)−
∫ t∗∗
t∗
eq(t
∗∗−s)V2,2(f2(w2(s)), w2(s))ds
> eq(t
∗∗−t∗)(V1,1 + V1,2)(t∗)−
∫ t∗∗
t∗
eq(t
∗∗−s)V2,2(f2(w2(t∗)), w2(t∗))ds
= eq(t
∗∗−t∗)((V1,1 + V1,2)(t∗)− V2,2(f2(w2(t∗)), w2(t∗)))
+V2,2(f2(w2(t∗)), w2(t∗))
> V2,2(f2(w2(t∗∗)), w2(t∗∗)),
where the inequalities follow from that V2,2(f2(w2), w2) is strictly increasing in w2 and
dw2(t)
dt < 0.
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Now for t > t∗∗,
(V1,1 + V1,2)(t) = eq(t−t
∗∗)(V1,1 + V1,2)(t∗∗)−
∫ t
t∗∗
eq(t−s)V2,2(f2(w2(s)), w2(s))ds
> eq(t−t
∗∗)(V1,1 + V1,2)(t∗∗)−
∫ t
t∗∗
eq(t−s)V2,2(f2(w2(t∗∗)), w2(t∗∗))ds
= eq(t−t
∗∗)((V1,1 + V1,2)(t∗∗)− V2,2(f2(w2(t∗∗)), w2(t∗∗)))
+V2,2(f2(w2(t∗∗)), w2(t∗∗)).
Since (V1,1+V1,2)(t∗∗) > V2,2(f2(w2(t∗∗)), w2(t∗∗)), it is easily seen that limt→∞(V1,1+V1,2)(t) =
∞. This contradicts the fact that dV1,1dt < 0 (from equation (34)) and V1,1 + V1,2 < V1,1.
We further know that V1,1(t)/θ1 + V1,2(t)/θ2 = V1,1(t)(1/θ1 − 1/θ2) + (V1,1(t) + V1,2(t))/θ2 is
strictly decreasing in t. These and (36) imply that consumption falls and output increases with
duration of the report 1. The properties with report 2 are obvious.
(iv) Part (iii) and equation (40) imply that
V1,1(1/r + x1) + V1,2(1/r + x2) ≥ V2,1(1/r + x1) + V2,2(1/r + x2) = V2,2(1/r + x2).
Since (1/r + x2)/(1/r + x1) < (1/θ2)/(1/θ1) and V1,2 < 0, we have
V1,1(w1, w2)/θ1 + V1,2(w1, w2)/θ2 > V2,2(f2(w2), w2)/θ2.
We also know from part (iii),
V1,1(w1, w2) + V1,2(w1, w2) < V2,2(f2(w2), w2).
Equations (26) and (31) thus imply that, given a certain level of promised utilities, consumption
and output are always lower with report 1. (Of course, consumption in state 1 could be higher
than that in 2 if compared at different promised utilities.)
(v) u′(c)/(v′(y)/θ1) is the ratio of marginal utility of consumption to marginal disutility of production.
With a report 1, since V1,2 < 0, we have u′(c)/(v′(y)/θ1) = (V1,1 + θ1/θ2V1,2)/(V1,1 + V1,2) > 1.
With a report 2, since V2,1 = 0, we have u′(c)/(v′(y)/θ2) = (θ2/θ1V2,1+V2,2)/(V2,1+V2,2) = 1. To
show that the distortion increases with report 1, it is sufficient to show that V1,2/V1,1 is decreasing
along the time path. By convexity, V1,2/V1,1 is an increasing function of w2, because
∂(V1,2/V1,1)
∂w2
=
V1,22V1,1 − V1,2V1,12
V 21,1
=
V1,22((1/r + x1)V1,11 + (1/r + x2)V1,12)
V 21,1
− V1,12((1/r + x1)V1,21 + (1/r + x2)V1,22)
V 21,1
=
(1/r + x1)(V1,22V1,11 − V 21,12)
V 21,1
> 0.
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For any straight line f that is below but parallel to f2, the time path can cross f at most once;
otherwise suppose the time path crosses f from different directions twice, it contradicts equation
(19). Therefore, with a report 1, the time path moves farther and farther away from the line f2,
i.e., w2(t)− (1/r + x2)/(1/r + x1)w1(t) is decreasing, which implies that
V1,2(w1(t), w2(t))
V1,1(w1(t), w2(t))
=
V1,2(0, w2(t)− w1(t)(1/r + x2)/(1/r + x1))ew1(t)/(1/r+x1)
V1,1(0, w2(t)− w1(t)(1/r + x2)/(1/r + x1))ew1(t)/(1/r+x1)
=
V1,2(0, w2(t)− w1(t)(1/r + x2)/(1/r + x1))
V1,1(0, w2(t)− w1(t)(1/r + x2)/(1/r + x1))
is decreasing in t.
(vi) Equations (24), (25), (29), and (30) imply that
d(V1,1 + V1,2)
dt
= q((V1,1 + V1,2)− (V2,1 + V2,2)),
d(V2,1 + V2,2)
dt
= q((V2,1 + V2,2)− (V1,1 + V1,2)).
Define Φ(t, w, ιt) = Vιt,1(w1, w2) + Vιt,2(w1, w2). Using the Dynkin’s formula stated in the proof
of Theorem 1, since
AΦ(t, w, 1) =
d(V1,1 + V1,2)
dt
+ q((V2,1 + V2,2)− (V1,1 + V1,2)) = 0,
AΦ(t, w, 2) =
d(V2,1 + V2,2)
dt
+ q((V1,1 + V1,2)− (V2,1 + V2,2)) = 0,
we see that Et[(Vιs,1 + Vιs,2)] = (Vιt,1 + Vιt,2), i.e., Vιt,1(w1, w2) + Vιt,2(w1, w2) is a martingale.
By the martingale convergence theorem and equations (26) and (31), consumption converges to
0 a.s. Next we show that output converges to its upper bound a.s. Since V2,1 = 0,
lim
t→∞χ{ιt=2}V2,2(w1(t), w2(t)) = 0, a.s.,
where χ is the indicator function. This implies limt→∞ χ{ιt=1}V1,1(w1(t), w2(t)) = 0, a.s., because
V1,1 equals V2,2 on f2 and falls with the duration of report 1. It follows that limt→∞ χ{ιt=1}V1,2(w1(t), w2(t)) =
0. Therefore,
lim
t→∞Vιt,1(w1(t), w2(t))/θ1 + Vιt,2(w1(t), w2(t))/θ2 = 0, a.s.,
which, with equations (26) and (31), implies that the output converges to its upper bound.
Q.E.D.
APPENDIX B: Auxiliary Results
Lemma 7 V1,11 > 0, V1,22 ≥ 0, V1,12 ≤ 0, V2,11 ≥ 0, V2,22 > 0, V2,12 ≤ 0.
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Proof of Lemma 7: We only prove for V1. That V1,22 ≥ 0 follows from the convexity of V1.
Differentiating (40) with respect to w2 yields
V1,2(w1, w2) = V1,12(w1, w2)(1/r + x1) + V1,22(w1, w2)(1/r + x2).(48)
Since V1,2 ≤ 0, V1,22 ≥ 0, we find that V1,12 ≤ 0. Differentiating (40) with respect to w1 yields
V1,1(w1, w2) = V1,11(w1, w2)(1/r + x1) + V1,12(w1, w2)(1/r + x2).
Since V1,1 > 0, V1,12 ≤ 0, we find that V1,11 > 0. Q.E.D.
Lemma 8 On efficiency lines,
V1,1(w1, f1(w1)) ≤ V2,2(w1, f1(w1)), V1,1(f2(w2), w2) ≥ V2,2(f2(w2), w2).
Proof of Lemma 8: We only prove the first inequality. At (w1, w2), w2 > f1(w1), the optimal
control is µ2 =∞, and the system immediately jumps. If we restrict µ2 = 0, we will have an inequality
version of the HJB equation (see, for example, Fleming and Soner (2006, equation (7.3), p.132)),
0 ≤ min
c
{c− (V1,1 + V1,2)u(c)}+min
y
{−y + (V1,1/θ1 + V1,2/θ2)v(y)}+ q1V2(w1, w2)
+ V1,1((q1 + r)w1 − q1w2) + V1,2((q2 + r)w2 − q2w1)− (q1 + r)V1(w1, w2).
When w2 = f1(w1), the right side is 0 (according to the HJB equation) and V1,2 = V1,22 = V1,12 = 0.
We have
0 ≤ ∂(the right side)
∂w2
∣∣∣
w2=f1(w1)
= q1(V2,2(w1, f1(w1))− V1,1(w1, f1(w1))).
Q.E.D.
Lemma 9 If V1,1 < V2,2 on f1, then V1 ≥ V2 for all w2 ≤ f1(w1). Similarly, if V1,1 > V2,2 on f2, then
V1 ≤ V2 for all w1 ≤ f2(w2).
Proof of Lemma 9: If V1,1 < V2,2 on f1, then starting from (w1, f1(w1)), the time path with report
1 moves below f1 because (25) implies
dV1,2
dt
= q1V1,1 − q1V2,2 + (q1 − q2)V1,2 < 0.
This means that on the time path, the slack control variable µ2 is 0. But V2 is the cost of controlling
the process with one more slack variable (µ1), and having more control variables always lowers the cost.
Thus V2(w1, w2) ≤ V1(w1, w2), for w2 ≤ f1(w1). Q.E.D.
Lemma 10 On efficiency lines,
V1,1(w1, f1(w1)) < V2,2(w1, f1(w1)), V1,1(f2(w2), w2) = V2,2(f2(w2), w2).
39
Proof of Lemma 10: There are four possibilities, and we will rule out three of them.
(i) If V1,1 = V2,2 on both f1 and f2, since V1,1(w1, w2) − V2,2(w1, w2) is strictly decreasing in w2, it
is a contradiction to the fact that f1 is above f2.
(ii) If V1,1 = V2,2 on f1, and V1,1 > V2,2 on f2, then Lemma 9 states that V2(w1, w2) ≥ V1(w1, w2),
for w1 ≤ f2(w2). In particular, since f1 is to the left of f2, we know that
V1(w1, f1(w1)) ≤ V2(w1, f1(w1)).
But the assumption that V1,1 = V2,2 on f1 yields
V1(w1, f1(w1)) = V1,1(w1, f1(w1)) (1/r + x1)
> V2,2(w1, f1(w1)) (1/r + x2)
> V2,1(w1, f1(w1)) (1/r + x1) + V2,2(w1, f1(w1)) (1/r + x2)
= V2(w1, f1(w1)),
where the first line follows from (40) and V1,2 = 0 on f2, the second line from x1 > x2, the third
line from V2,1 < 0 on f2, and the last line from (40) again. Thus there is a contradiction.
(iii) If V1,1 < V2,2 on f1, and V1,1 > V2,2 on f2, then Lemma 9 implies that V1(w1, w2) = V2(w1, w2)
if f−12 (w1) ≤ w2 ≤ f1(w1). But then V2,1 = V1,1 > 0 contradicts part (iii) in Lemma 2.
Q.E.D.
APPENDIX C: Extensions to Other Homogeneous Utilities
In Section 5 we derive the results on the dynamics of the optimal contract with logarithmic utility
and disutility functions. These results can be generalized to include functional forms as c
1−σ
1−σ and
− exp(−σc), as long as some form of homogeneity exists. Although the exact form of homogeneity
varies in each case, all the interesting results (including efficiency lines, absorbing region, dynamic
properties of policy functions, and immiserization) remain unchanged. We will briefly lay out results
from the following three extensions, most of which can be proved by the same techniques used for the
logarithmic case.
(i) σ > 0: u(c) = − exp(−σc), c ∈ R, and v(y) = exp(σy), y ∈ R.
(ii) σ > 1: u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ , c > 0, and v(y) = − (−y)
1−σ
1−σ , y < 0.
(iii) 0 < σ < 1: u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ , c > 0, and v(y) = − (−y)
1−σ
1−σ , y < 0.
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Different from the logarithmic case, here the sets of implementable utilities W are proper subsets
of R2. Although utility and disutility functions are unbounded here, we can still use the four families
of contracts discussed in Section 4 to find boundaries of W . (Note that some of the boundaries are
degenerate, and W is no longer compact.) For each of the above three cases, we get
(i) W =
{
(w1, w2) ∈ R2 : w1 < w2 < θ1θ2w1 < 0
}
.
(ii) W =
{
(w1, w2) ∈ R2 : w1 < w2 < θ1θ2w1 < 0
}
.
(iii) W =
{
(w1, w2) ∈ R2 : 0 < θ1θ2w1 < w2 ≤ w1
}
∪ {(0, 0)}.
The homogeneity properties for the logarithmic case in Lemma 2 are modified as
(i) For any λ > 0,
Vi (λw1, λw2) = − log(λ)
σr
+ Vi(w1, w2), i = 1, 2.(49)
(ii) For any λ > 0,
Vi (λw1, λw2) = λ
1
1−σ Vi(w1, w2), i = 1, 2.(50)
(iii) For any λ > 0,
Vi (λw1, λw2) = λ
1
1−σ Vi(w1, w2), i = 1, 2.(51)
As to Lemma 2, the monotonicity properties
V1,2 ≤ 0, V1,1 > 0, V2,1 ≤ 0, and V2,2 > 0
still hold, but the proofs for them need modifications.
(i) To see that V1,1 > 0, differentiating equation (49) at λ = 1, we have
V1,1w1 + V1,2w2 = − 1
σr
.(52)
It follows from w1 < 0, w2 < 0, and V1,2 ≤ 0 that V1,1 > 0.
(ii) To see that V1,1 > 0, differentiating equation (50) at λ = 1, we have
V1,1w1 + V1,2w2 = (
1
1− σ − 1)V1.(53)
It follows from ( 11−σ − 1) < 0, V1 > 0, w1 < 0, w2 < 0, and V1,2 ≤ 0 that V1,1 > 0.
(iii) To see that V1,1 > 0, differentiating equation (51) at λ = 1, we have
V1,1w1 + V1,2w2 = (
1
1− σ − 1)V1.(54)
It follows from ( 11−σ − 1) > 0, V1 > 0, w1 > 0, w2 > 0, and V1,2 ≤ 0 that V1,1 > 0.
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The definitions of the two efficiency lines remain unchanged; however, the domains of the lines
are restricted to be (−∞, 0) in case (i), (−∞, 0) in case (ii), and [0,∞) in case (iii). They still are
straight lines, but are no longer parallel to each other. Instead, f1 and f2 will have an intersection
point at (0, 0). Lemmas 3 and 4 still hold and can be proved using the same proofs. The two HJB
equations remain unchanged. The ODE system is still valid, except that the optimal policies from
minc{c − (V1,1 + V1,2)u(c)} and miny{−y + (V1,1/θ1 + V1,2/θ2)v(y)} depend on particular functional
forms (they are no longer c = (V1,1 + V1,2), y = −(V1,1/θ1 + V1,2/θ2)).
Away from the intersection point (0, 0), line f1 is still strictly above f2, thus Lemma 5 remains valid
and can be proved using the same proof. The set of W is again split into three regions. Lemma 6 is
still valid, and when the Markov chain is symmetric, the region between f2 and the lower boundary of
W is absorbing. Because the proof of Lemma 6 uses the homogeneity property of logarithmic utilities,
we need to modify the proof to utilize equations (49), (50), and (51). (The procedure is routine and
details are omitted.)
Last, all the implications from Theorem 3 remain valid.
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